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Protecting the Mentally Retarded:
An Empirical Survey and Evaluation
of the Establishment of State
Guardianship in Minnesotat
Minnesota's program of state guardianship has gained
national attention in the search for devices to protect
and care for mentally deficient and epileptic persons.
While not finally assessing the actual supervision of
wards by the state commissioner of public welfare, this
report scrutinizes the standards and procedures uti-
lized by the probate courts and welfare departments in
establishing guardianship. This article stresses the need
for reform of current practices to ensure proper coopera-
tion between judicial and behavioral authorities, and to
ensure proper safeguards for the individual rights of per-
sons who may be subjected to governmental authority.
Likewise, the author concludes, the device of guardian-
ship should not be employed as a convenient tool for
treatment of a variety of social problems which do not
involve mental retardation.
Robert J. Levy*
The Congress of the United States, a number of state legisla-
tures, even the community at large, have apparently overcome
their traditional indifference - or embarrassment, perhaps -
about the problems of the mentally retarded. Great strides are
being taken to obtain adequate treatment and protective pro-
grams; research of enormous variety is burgeoning; experimenta-
tion with new educational, treatment, and custodial methods is
tThe factual data reported in this essay were gathered while the author
was engaged in a study of state guardianship in Minnesota, as a consultant
to The Mental Competency Study (U.S. Public Health Service Grant, MH
1038, Director, Richard C. 'Allen, Professor of Law, The George Washington
University Graduate School of Public Law), which is supported by the
National Institute of Mental Health in cooperation with the National Law
Center, The George Washington University, Washington, D. C. The author
takes sole responsibility for the data and conclusions.
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
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in progress.- Retardation is obviously in the public spotlight. It
is not surprising that legal doctrines concerning the retarded have
also attracted fresh inquiry: "particularly in recent times, the law
has expressed its concern for the weak, 'the naturally disabled,'
in a rapidly expanding body of statute and opinion."' Much of
the recent interest has been lavished upon an ancient legal device
- "guardianship." Legislation in most states authorizes judicial
(commonly probate court) appointment of a private individual
as the personal protective agent of an incompetent.3
Guardianship is a mechanism through which the court, acting for
society, "guards" the rights and liberties of a retarded person when he
cannot guard them for himself. It accomplishes this by transferring the
legal power of choice in certain personal ... matters from the retarded
person to another who is able and willing to exercise it.
Because guardianship eliminates or circumscribes the ward's
"power of choice," of course, the guardian can also minimize the
retarded person's ability to jeopardize the rights and liberties of
others. Although protection and control are valuable goals, the
method used to attain them cannot be ignored - the retarded
person is deprived of his discretion.
National attention has been focused on Minnesota because its
Probate Code permits "mentally deficient" and "epileptic" per-
sons to rely upon, or be subjected to, the "guardianship" of a
government official. The Minnesota statute could not go unnot-
iced; since professional observers have found community retarda-
tion programs inadequate, especially when the retardate has not
been able to rely upon his parents' protection, any promising de-
vice deserves consideration. Thus, the President's Panel on Men-
tal Retardation suggested:
The protection of guardianship should not be denied where there is
no suitable relative to undertake it . . . . One possible solution is the
establishment, perhaps through the State Protective Agency . . . , of
a program of public guardianship of the person. Although guardianship
1. See generally Maternal and Child Health and Mental Retardation
Planning Amendments of 1963, 77 Stat. 275, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1391-94 (Supp. V,
1964); Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers
Construction Act of 1963, 77 Stat. 284, 42 U.S.C. §H 2661-96 (Supp. V, 1964);
U.S. PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDATION, A PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR
NATIONAL AcTIoN To COMBAT MENTAL RETARDATION (1962) [hereinafter
cited as PROGRAM FOR NATIONAL ACTION].
2. TASK FORCE ON LAw, U.S. PRESIDENT'S PANEL ON MENTAL RETARDA-
TIoN, REPORT 1 (1963) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE ON LAW].
3. See generally LIDrMAN & MCINTYRE, Tm MENTALLY DISABLED AND
THE LAW 225-51 (1961).
4. TASK FORCE ON LAw 24.
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might then be formally vested in a State agency, duties would actually
be carried out by individual staff members. The experience of Minne-
sota with such a program might well be studied by other States.5
In addition, Minnesota "state guardianship" has received the
commendation of nationally recognized experts in the field." But
empirical data has been lacking.
This essay reports part of a survey of the Minnesota program
- observations of the standards applied and the procedures fol-
lowed by probate courts in "committing" persons to the guardian-
ship of the commissioner of public welfare.7 The wisdom of
commitment policies cannot be finally assessed, of course, without
an examination of the benefits and disadvantages of the guardian's
actual supervision of his wards. Nonetheless, it seemed appropri-
ate to publish this part of the study separately; proceedings to
establish guardianship have not attracted the attention their im-
portance to individual liberties warrants, and they have too often
been conducted without minimal safeguards. Other states con-
sidering a state guardianship program should be apprised of the
risks; the local bar should be apprised of current practices and
the urgent need for reforms. In any event, the commitment proc-
ess illustrates in microcosm the importance and difficulty of two
problems which pervade social program planning for the mentally
or emotionally disabled: (1) how to insure that the judicial hear-
ing permits cooperation between the judicial officer and the be-
havioral experts who participate, without sacrificing the rights of
the subject of the hearing; (2) how to resolve "the critical issue
between the law and the caretaking professions" - who should
have ultimate authority "to impose 'superior' judgment on an
unwilling, unconscious, unprotected or uninformed subject."8
It may be useful to begin by suggesting, very generally, the
safeguards which an ideal guardianship program would incorpor-
5. PROGRAM FOR NATIONAL AcTioN 152.
6. Dr. Elizabeth M. Boggs, a member of the President's Panel and a past
president of the National Association for Retarded Children, wrote: "I have
always considered that the Minnesota guardianship program was twenty
years ahead of most other states in recognition of these basic concepts (of
responsibility)." The remark, dated July 23, 1957, was quoted in Advisory
Board on Handicapped, Gifted and Exceptional Children, Report-The
Trainable Retarded Child in Minnesota 23 (June 18, 1958).
7. The term "commitment" is used in this essay to signify only the pro-
bate court order establishing the commissioner of public welfare as a person's
guardian. That is the common meaning of the term in Minnesota. "Institu-
tionalization" is used throughout to describe a person's removal from the
community.
8. TAs FORCE ON LAw 19.
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ate. These ideas are by no means original. Many of them were
included in the Report by the Task Force on Law. Of utmost im-
portance was the general principle framed by the Task Force:
It is a basic democratic principle that no diminution of human rights
and human dignity can be countenanced by the law for any person -
let alone any class of persons -except for good reason, following due
process, and then to the minimum degree necessary and for the shortest
period possible.9
The process by which guardianship is established must be safe-
guarded. The statute should state its boundaries with clarity. The
retardation program suffers if judges are given no valid method
of identifying retardates who require community concern: a
guardian may not be available to exercise supervision if a retar-
date jeopardizes his own safety or the community's. The risks, to
the guardian and to wards, are equally substantial if the legisla-
tion does not adequately specify those who were to be excluded
from the guardianship program: welfare departments may have
to squander precious resources, especially personnel, supervising
wards who would be as well off entirely on their own; those wards
who require, or could profit from, closer supervision may be denied
the maximum benefits of guardianship; the guardian's powers may
be used to impose unjustly on individuals who should not have
been deprived of their discretion. Safeguards must also surround
the guardian's use of his powers in supervising and controlling his
ward - protecting the ward while permitting flexibility in pro-
gram operation. A ward's freedom should be maximized consistent
with his abilities; the scope of the guardian's powers should be
specified in the order appointing him; the court should regularly,
if not automatically, review the ward's condition and should re-
quire reports from the guardian during intervening periods; invol-
untarily institutionalized wards should have some independent
protector who could terminate unnecessary detention. In short,
"the law must . . . protect the rights of the retarded; it cannot
rely exclusively on the good intentions of those who manage in-
stitutions and other programs."o
I.
The Minnesota probate courts are authorized to commit "men-
tally deficient" and "epileptic" persons to the guardianship of the
9. Ibid.
10. PROGRAM: FOR NATIONAL ACTION 149-50. This essay focuses on the
risks of guardianship by a government agency. This is not to suggest that
similar safeguards are unimportant when a private guardian is appointed.
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commissioner of public welfare, an appointive official who ad-
ministers all state welfare programs. The institutionalization of
"mentally ill" persons is also accomplished by probate court pro-
ceedings; but the commissioner's responsibility to persons institu-
tionalized as "mentally ill" is much more limited. The statutory
framework of the state guardianship program is described below.
Initially, a brief historical survey may be helpful.
A. Tim LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
Minnesota's program for the mentally retarded began in 1851,
at the first meeting of the then territorial legislature. Probate
court judges were delegated care and custody of the person and
property of "idiots, lunatics, and other persons of unsound
mind. . . ." An institution for the feebleminded was authorized at
Faribault. Subsequent legislatures prohibited placement of the
mentally retarded in the state hospital for the insane, required the
Faribault institution to provide the retarded with proper "train-
ing and instruction," and established additional schools and hos-
pitals for "idiots and imbeciles," "defectives," and for the "epilep-
tic."" In 1910, the Board of Control (whose powers are now exer-
cised by the commissioner of public welfare) employed a well
known psychologist, Dr. Fred Kuhlmann, to devise a mental test-
ing program for use in state institutions and to provide better
classification of retardates. Dr. Kuhlmann became the director of
research at Faribault. His views were influential in the subsequent
development of Minnesota's retardation program; the policies he
favored are still reflected in the county welfare departments' ad-
ministration of state guardianship. 2
A 1916 Governor's Commission on Child Welfare recommended
legislation authorizing the Board of Control to exercise guardian-
ship of the feebleminded. The commission believed that ultimate
See generally TAsK FORCE ON LAw 25-26; LmmuN& & McINTYRE, op. cit. .Supra
note 3.
11. This material is based upon an undated mimeographed statement dis-
covered in the files of the Section for Mentally Deficient and Epileptic, Min-
nesota Department of Public Welfare. A copy has been placed on file in the
University of Minnesota Law Library. For a more detailed description of
the historical development of the program, see To-xisoN, PROLOGUE 1-5,
14-32 (1963) [hereinafter cited as THomsoN]. Miss Thomson was the super-
visor of the Section for Mentally Deficient and Epileptic from 1924 to 1959.
12. Miss Thomson commented that Dr. Kuhlmann "influenced me, but I
could never wholly agree with him . . . ." TnosrsoN 32. Nonetheless, under
Miss Thomson's leadership, state policies concerning the guardianship program
were consistent with Dr. Kuhlimann's views. See particularly notes 71-79,
104-23 infra and accompanying text.
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responsibility for the handicapped should rest with a state agency
rather than with private individuals and organizations." In addi-
tion, the "commitment" provision was designed to permit the
agency to exercise authoritative control of retarded persons:
Almost every community in the state furnishes examples of heredi-
tary feeble-mindedness. Our present laws do not permit the compulsory
commitment of feeble-minded persons to, nor their detention in, the
state school for the feeble-minded at Faribault. Cases are not infre-
quent of mentally subnormal children whose presence in the community
is a serious public menace, and for whose own welfare the wise and
kindly segregation of the state institution is needed, but whose parents
cannot be induced to take the simple steps necessary for their admis-
sion. For such, and especially for girls and women of child-bearing age,
there is needed a compulsory commitment law. . . . This measure is
both remedial and preventive in its purpose.14
The statute defined a "feebleminded person" as one "who is so
mentally defective as to be incapable of managing himself and his
affairs, and to require supervision, control and care for his own
or the public welfare."' 5
The 1917 statute had not been substantially modified when,
in 1933, the Minnesota Bar Association began a thorough study
of the guardianship provisions and the other sections of the Pro-
bate Code. Although the 1935 Code revised the provisions gov-
erning appointment of private guardians of the person," only two
major changes were made in the state guardianship program.
Commitment to the commissioner's guardianship was authorized
for any "epileptic person";17 the term was left undefined, and the
1917 definition of "feebleminded person" was deleted." The de-
cision to forego definitions was a product of the judges' unhappi-
ness with the prior statutory language and their assurance that
they would be able to "determine whether or not a patient is ...
feebleminded, without a statutory definition."" Moreover, the
13. Minn. Child Welfare Comm'n, Report (1917); see TollisoN 16-17.
14. Minn. Child Welfare Comm'n, Report 11-12 (1917).
15. Minn. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 344, § 1.
16. See Pearson, Guardianships and Commitments Under the Probate
Code, 20 Must. L. REV. 333 (1936).
17. See Minn. Sess. Laws 1935, ch. 72, 3§ 173-84.
18. Ibid.; see 2 PATTON, MNTESOTA PROBATE LAw Alm PRAcTIcE § 551
(1955).
19. Undated Memorandum From the Honorable Albin S. Pearson, Chair-
man, to Other Members of the Bar Association Probate Code Committee
(approximately December, 1934). This document, and other working papers
of the committee are on file in the Ramsey County Probate Court. The pub-
lished explanations focused on the difficulties of the prior definitions. See 2
PATTON, op. cit. supra note 18, § 551; Pearson, supra note 16, at 842-44.
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experts could not agree on an appropriate method of categorizing
defectives. The American Medical Association took the position
that incompetents should be classified only when the most appro-
priate institution had to be chosen:
As I see it, if a person is mentally unsound from a legal standpoint, he
requires the appointment of a guardian for himself or for his estate, or
for both, and possibly commitment to an institution. It matters not
whether his incapacity is due to heredity, defect, habits, disease, injury,
or old age, or any or all of them.20
The AMA could not have known - although local doctors should
have - that this suggestion required basic modification of either
the retardation or the mental illness program. Retardates are com-
mitted to the commissioner's guardianship for life, while the men-
tally ill receive his protection only during their stay in an institu-
tion.' The theory is that "the mentally ill are to be made well ....
But the needs of the mentally retarded continue year after year,
changing but with ever-present needs - even those of many who
can become self-supporting." 22 So long as the programs differ,
retardates must be distinguished.
The Board of Control objected to the doctors' recommenda-
tion, but offered no alternative." The drafting committee appar-
ently agreed with the chairman's reason for leaving the terms un-
defined: "if there can be no agreement as to what the definition
should be, why not avoid it."" The problem was much more diffi-
cult than the committee appreciated: the relationship of organic
to psychological and sociocultural elements in retardation was
known to be complex; retarded wards were left to the mercy of
the county welfare departments and the institutional staffs; and
the probate judges had exhibited no special competence for de-
20. Letter From William C. Woodward, M.D., to Honorable Albin S.
Pearson, July 24, 1934, on le in Ramsey County Probate Court.
21. Compare MINx. STAT. § 525.753(1) (1961) with Mum. STAT. §
525.753(2) (1961). The commissioner exercises general supervision of state
hospitals for the mentally ill. MArh. STAT. H§ 246.01, .013 (1961). But MntU.
STAT. § 246.01(9) (1961) specifically constitutes him guardian of "all feeble-
minded or epileptic persons . . ..
22. THoMsoN 234.
23. Both 2 PATTox, op. cit. supra note 18, § 551, and Judge Pearson, supra
note 19, at 342, claimed that the Board of Control agreed to the elimination of
definitions. The drafting committee told a different story: "We assure you we
have done everything in our power to secure agreement between the Medical
Profession and the State Board of Control, but we have failed." Undated
Memorandum From Drafting Committee to "General Committee and Mem-
bers of the Bar," on le in Ramsey County Probate Court.
24. Memorandum From Honorable Albin S. Pearson to Drafting Commit-
tee, July 24, 1934, on file in Ramsey County Probate Court.
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termining "whether or not a patient is . . . feebleminded" even
with a statutory definition2 The 1945 legislature partially rein-
stated the 1917 definition of a "feebleminded person"; the term
"epileptic person" was finally defined in 1959.26
B. THE CURRENT STATUTORY FRMEWORK
A "mentally deficient person" is now defined as anyone "other
than a mentally ill person, so mentally defective as to require
supervision, control, or care for his own or the public welfare."2 7
A commitment proceeding may be initiated by a relative or by
any reputable resident of the county 8 The county welfare board
must investigate the subject of the petition - the "patient" -
and file a report in advance of the hearing "for the use and guid-
ance of the examiners .. ". 2 The probate courts in the three
counties containing cities of the first class (Hennepin, Ramsey and
St. Louis) may order such an investigation; 0 and the welfare de-
partments in these counties always provide some type of prehear-
ing reports, even though a formal request is seldom made. In the
absence of waiver, the commissioner of public welfare is given
10 days notice of all commitment hearings. 1 In rural counties,
the probate judge usually handles mental deficiency hearings per-
sonally; in Ramsey County (which includes St. Paul) and Henne-
pin County (which includes Minneapolis), hearings are conducted
by a specially designated official.3 2 The county attorney must ap-
25. See note 51 infra and accompanying text.
26. See note 200 and text accompanying note 108 infra.
27. Mnu. STAT. § 525.749(6) (1961). For the definition of "epileptic per-
son," see the text acompanying note 200 infra. Unless otherwise indicated,
this discussion of the commitment provisions and the commissioner's guardian-
ship powers is equally applicable to "epileptic persons."
28. Mmw. STAT. § 525.751(1) (1961). Adequate notice is required. MmN.
STAT. Arw. § 525.752(2) (Supp. 1964); In re Wretlind, 225 Minn. 554, 32
N.W.2d 161 (1948).
29. MmN. STAT. § 525.752(1) (1961). The quoted phrase goes on to say
"and the institution to which such persons may be committed." This conclud-
ing clause suggests that the report was designed for mental illness hearings.
But the provision is uniformly interpreted to apply to mental deficiency com-
mitments as well. Interview With Miss Francis Coakley, Supervisor of Sec-
tion for Mentally Deficient and Epileptic of the Minnesota Department of
Public Welfare, in St. Paul, July 7, 1963 [hereinafter cited as Coakley Inter-
view, July 7, 1963].
30. Mmw. STAT. § 525.752(1) (1961).
31. Mmx. STAT. & 525.752(2) (1961).
32. Ramsey County holds mental deficiency commitment hearings one day
each week; they are conducted by a referee appointed by the probate judge.
In Hennepin County, the hearings are monthly and are always conducted by
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pear to represent the petitioner.3 If the patient requests the serv-
ice, "the court shall appoint counsel for him, if he is financially
unable to obtain counsel."" Although the patient is almost never
provided counsel under this provision, the probate courts do ap-
point a "guardian ad litem" - usually an attorney - to represent
the patient's interests 3
During the hearing the patient is evaluated by an examining
board which must include "two licensed doctors of medicine . . . "3
The probate court may add to the board a "person skilled in the
ascertainment of mental deficiency" to assist in the examination.3 7
Hennepin County's interpretation of this provision is probably
unique; the court commissioner insists that the examining board
include one local psychiatrist who claims that he is qualified to
administer one of the standard I.Q. tests." Findings must be
made jointly by the examiners and the court." Either the com-
missioner or "any person aggrieved, other than the commissioner,"
may appeal the probate court's decision to the district court.0
If the patient is found to be "mentally deficient," the probate
court need do no more than "appoint the commissioner guardian
of his person and commit him to the care and custody of such
commissioner."41
The commissioner's responsibilities to his wards are actually
fulfilled by social caseworkers employed by the 87 county welfare
boards. The county boards "administer a program of social serv-
the court commissioner-a constitutionally created judicial officer. MmN.
CONST. art. 6, § 15. Mmx. STAT. § 525.763 (1961) permits the court com-
missioner to act upon a petition "when the probate judge is unable to do so."
The Hennepin County practice is justified if the statutory provision refers to
the probate judge's work load.
33. Mnm. STAT. § 525.751(4) (1961).
34. Ibid. The court may provide counsel "in all other cases . . . if it
determines the interests of the patient requires counsel." Ibid.
35. This practice has become uniform since the decision in In re Wretlind,
225 Minn. 554, 32 N.W.2d 161 (1948). See notes 247-50 infra and accompany-
ing text.
36. Mmx. STAT. § 525.752(1) (1961).
37. Ibid. The probate courts often appoint at least one psychiatrist. The
1935 Probate Code required the appointment of "two persons skilled in the
ascertainment of mental deficiency" rather than doctors. Minn. Sess. Laws
1935, ch. 72, § 175; see note 252 infra and accompanying text.
38. Interview With Frank Bessesen, Esq., Court Commissioner of Hen-
nepin County Probate Court, in Minneapolis, Sept. 20, 1963; see note 253
infra and accompanying text.
39. See 9 PATToN, op. cit. supra note 18, § 554.
40. Mmw. STAT. § 525.79 (1961). For details of the appellate procedures,
see Mnw. STAT. §§ 525.71-.74 (1961).
41. Max STAT. § 525.753(2) (1961).
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ices and financial assistance," "supervise wards of the commis-
sioner and, when so designated, act as agent of the commissioner
of public welfare . .. ."' The commissioner's powers as guardian
at least equal those traditionally enjoyed by private guardians of
the person: he must consent to the ward's adoption;4 3 he may hold
limited sums of the ward's estate and expend them for the ward's
benefit;44 under some conditions the commissioner may be able to
arrange a mentally deficient ward's sterilization;45 a ward cannot
marry without the commissioner's permission." The commission-
er's authority has not been ignored. Recently, a member of the
commissioner's staff was asked to approve a ward's plans for
marriage:
42. MrN. STAT. H§ 393.07 subd. 1(a), subd. 2 (1961).
43. MuNt. STAT. § 259.24(1) (1961).
44. Mn. STAT. 4§ 256.88-.93 (1961). Insurance benefits and other funds
can be placed in a "Social Welfare Fund"; such deposits earn interest. In
addition, the probate court can authorize the commissioner to take possession
of the ward's personal property, liquidate it, and invest the proceeds in the
Social Welfare Fund. Mar. STAT. § 256.93 (1961). The attorney general ruled
that this provision is applicable only if the value of the ward's personal prop-
erty does not exceed $1,000. See Op. Att'y Gen. Minn. 88-A-27f, Sept. 24,
1948.
45. Mar. STAT. § 256.07 (1961) The commissioner must consult "a repu-
table physician, and a psychologist" and must obtain the written consent of the
ward's spouse and nearest kin. See Op. Att'y Gen. Minn. 88-A-27T-E, Sept. 25,
1941. But if no spouse or near relative can be found, the commissioner's con-
sent is sufficient. At one time sterilization of wards was common. In the first
three years after the statute's passage in 1925, 157 females and 8 males were
sterilized. During 1940-1942, 155 females and 63 males were sterilized. The
incidence decreased thereafter, in part because of changes in attitudes toward
both the retarded and sterilization. THomsoN 55-57, 143, 182-83. Although
the commissioner's staff now discourages sterilization, the county welfare de-
partments have not forgotten the statutory provision. See, e.g., text accom-
panying note 52 infra.
The sterilization statute does not apply to wards committed as "epileptic
persons." But see Mnqr. DEP'T OF PUBLic WELFARE, MANUAL - MENTAL
DEFIcIENCY AND EPnLmPsy 8 (1959) [hereinafter cited as DPW MANUAL]. The
Manual recommends that persons who are both mentally deficient and epileptic
should be committed as mentally deficient -because mental deficiency is a
"more basic condition" and because sterilization will be permissible.
46. Must. STAT. ANN. § 517.03 (Supp. 1964). The commissioner may grant
his consent "if it appears from his investigation that such marriage is for the
best interest of the ward and the public." Ibid.
The Minnesota constitution disenfranchises any person under guardian-
ship. MNr CONST. art. 7, & 9. In addition, wards may be subject to discrim-
ination - for example, a ward may find it difficult to enlist in the armed
services unless the commissioner is willing to commend his reliability and
predict his success. Coakley Interview, July 7, 1963.
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As did not seem to understand too well I repeated many times
the law says he could not get married while he is under this guardian-
ship but if he proved himself to be a really good citizen, no drinking,
and employed steadily, then maybe he could apply and see if he could
get special consent. He wanted to know what a good citizen did. I told
him about being steadily employed and definitely setting up a savings
account, and not running around with the fellows that are always
getting drunk and getting into trouble with the law, etc.47
The commissioner is also permitted to control his ward's en-
vironment. He administers all institutions for the mentally defi-
cient; 8 and the Probate Code expressly authorizes the commis-
sioner to place any mentally deficient ward "in an appropriate
home, hospital, or institution or [to] exercise general supervision
over him anywhere in the state outside of any institution through
any child welfare board or other appropriate agency thereto au-
thorized by the commissioner."" In 1962 the state's three largest
institutions contained 6,162 inhabitants, almost all of them wards
of the commissioner. 0 Of course, many of these wards probably
chose institutional life - but some of them certainly did not. Dur-
ing the depression, for example,
When the new county boards and their executives found some
households living under deplorable conditions, they requested mental
tests, and in many instances whole families were then committed to
47. File # 1, July 8, 1963. This citation (and others like it hereinafter cited)
refers to dated dictation in either the county's or the commissioner's casework
file on an individual ward. The numbers have been assigned in accordance
with the order in which they appear in this essay. A chart correlating these
numbers with the actual ile numbers has been filed with the supervisor, Sec-
tion for Mentally Deficient and Epileptic, Minnesota Department of Public
Welfare.
Of course, many wards go across state lines to marry. But this is not
necessarily the end of the matter. A nonward spouse is often "counseled very
strictly" to obtain a divorce because of the risks of marriage to a retardate;
occasionally the county attorney is used as an "authority figure" in such
endeavors. See Interview With Miss Frances Coakley, Supervisor, and Miss
Shirley Bengston, Director of Casework Services, Section for Mentally Defi-
cient and Epileptic of the Minnesota Department of Public Welfare, in St.
Paul, July 8, 1963 [hereinafter cited as Coakley-Bengston Interview].
48. Mmr. STAT. §§ 252.025-.03 (1961).
49. Mar. STAT. § 525.762(2) (1961).
50. See MaN. GOVERNOR's Anvisonv Commr. on MENTAL RETARDATION,
REPORT 36 (1962). Very few of the institutional inmates are not under guardi-
anship. See notes 129-43 infra and accompanying text. In fiscal 1962-1963,
280 persons were institutionalized for the first time; 32 persons were rein-
stitutionalized. Intervew with Miss Frances Coakley, Supervisor, Section for
Mentally Deficient and Epileptic of the Minnesota Department of Public
Welfare, in St. Paul, Nov. 26, 1963.
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guardianship as feeble minded. The Department . . . was powerless to
relieve these situations after commitment had taken place, but appar-
ently the boards were satisfied that they had taken some kind of
action. . . . Later some of these families were difficult to work with;
not all those tested and committed to guardianship under the circum-
stances proved to be really feeble minded and their frustrating experi-
ences made them resentful.5
The commissioner's authority to institutionalize wards has
been utilized to reinforce his other powers. As recently as the late
1950s, according to the commissioner's staff, the marriage of an
unsterilized ward often influenced local welfare departments to
arrange the ward's emergency placement in an institution and to
hold him there until he agreed to sterilization; occasionally, the
ward was forcibly moved to another part of the state for a period
sufficient, it was hoped, to encourage the spouses to lose interest
in each other.5 2 There is some evidence that such practices have
not been forgotten. In 1960, an institution caseworker informed
the county welfare department of his effort to obtain a 25 year-
old ward's consent to sterilization:
Finally, - asked if she had to have the operation, and she was told
that no one would insist upon it. She then asked if she did not have it
if she would have to remain in the institution. She was told that that
would be a matter for your Agency to decide. It was suggested to her
that it might possibly take a longer time to make plans without the
operation than with it.5s
Until it was abolished by the 1963 legislature,5 4 one of the in-
stitutions supervised by the commissioner was the "Annex for
Defective Delinquents" (ADD) - a floor of the St. Cloud State
Reformatory; the ADD housed some 40 "upper level" retardates
who were "serious behavior problems."" One ward, committed to
51. THomsoN 80. In 1968 the commissioner's staff discovered one inmate
at Faribault, institutionalized since the 1980's, who was not-and probably
had never been-mentally deficient.
52. Coakley-Bengston Interview.
53. File # 2, Sept. 92, 1960. Although the DPW Manual discourages "pres-
sure" to obtain consent to sterilization, it does indicate that sterilization may
facilitate community placement of an institutionalzed ward: "Under some
conditions a sterile person may be supervised in the community when under
the same conditions if he were not sterile, he should have a longer period in the
institution." DPW AniuAL 60.
54. Minn. Sess. Laws 1963 ch. 214, § 1 (amending MaIN. STAT. ANN.§ 243.75 (Supp. 1964)).
55. See DPW MANuAL 41. The Annex had a capacity of 75-80 men; from
the time it was opened in 1945 until its abolition, almost 800 wards had been
placed there. MAinn. Governor's Advisory Comm. on the Annex for Defective
Delinquents, Report and Recommendations, June 12, 1962.
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guardianship in 1929, had not tested below "dull normal" since
1949; nonetheless, he was placed in the ADD, without judicial
hearing, on three different occasions between 1950 and 1960."
Release from the ADD was a matter for the commissioner's dis-
cretion. Even after his release, the ward had reason to conduct his
affairs circumspectly: "If the ward becomes delinquent or any
situation arises that requires his immediate removal from the
community, the ADD will send for him immediately if notified
that he is held in custody . . . ."5
Some of these cases, no doubt, are atypical. Indeed, it is likely
that most wards never discover the extent to which the commis-
sioner can control their behavior." Nonetheless, an evaluation of
the commitment process requires a clear understanding of several
aspects of state guardianship: the commissioner's powers are
broad; his powers have been exercised; the Probate Code provides
no postcommitment judicial review of any kind - even of a deci-
sion to institutionalize a ward;59 most wards do not have the so-
phistication to seek a method of testing the commissioner's use of
his authority.
56. See File 9 3, memorandum dated Feb. 15, 1963. Later, the commis-
sioner made an effort to have the man restored to capacity, but the county
attorney opposed the petition and the probate judge denied it. See note 85
infra.
57. DPW MAIuAL 39.
58. "Contacts should be planned with all wards at least every six months
to determine what services are needed." Id. at 20; see text accompanying
notes 86, 143 and 191 infra.
59. A ward could probably test the propriety of his confinement in an
institution by writ of habeas corpus. See MNxx. STAT. § 589.01 (1961). To free
an institutionalized "mentally ill person," a petition seeking restoration to
capacity, rather than habeas corpus, is usually the appropriate method, see
State ex rel. Anderson v. United States Veterans Hosp., 268 Minn. 213, 223-
25, 128 N.W.Qd 710, 718-19 (1964), but that alternative is not always avail-
able to a ward. The ward may be "mentally deficient" but not in need of
institutional care; the statute seems to contemplate such a possibility. See
note 49 supra and accompanying text. Therefore, a ward may be unnecessarily
institutionalized although he is not eligible for restoration. State ex rel. Ray-
mond v. Lawrence, 86 Minn. 310, 812, 90 N.W. 769, 770 (1902), held that
habeas corpus is always available to test the propriety of any "attempt . . .
by a [private] guardian . . . to exercise any restraint over the person of any
one within this state ... ." An argument can be made that even if habeas
corpus is available, procedural due process entitles the ward to a judicial
hearing prior to institutionalization. Cf. Armstrong v. Manzo, 33 U.S.L. WEEK
4349 (U.S. April 27, 1965). See generally LImDwaA & McINTYRE, THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 23-37, 226 (1961); Kadish, A Case
Study in the Signification of Procedural Due Process - Institutionalizing
the Mentally Ill, 9 WESTERN PoLrrIcAL Q. 93, 110-15 (1956); Weihofen &
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A ward can be freed of the commissioner's supervision either
by "restoration to capacity" or by "discharge." A restoration peti-
tion can be filed by "any reputable person or the commissioner."oo
If the probate court finds that the ward is not "mentally defi-
cient," he must be restored to capacity. Any person may contest
the petition; the county attorney is specifically authorized to op-
pose restoration "if he deems it for the best interest of the public."0'
The procedure followed is apparently the same as for commit-
ment hearings. Only the commissioner can file a petition seeking
the ward's discharge - "when it appears to the commissioner"
that his ward "is no longer in need of guardianship or supervi-
sion," or when the commissioner can no longer exercise supervision
because the ward has left the state or cannot be found.62
Local welfare department personnel have occasionally delayed
Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 24 TErAs L. REv. 807, 346-48
(1946). It is not at all clear whether habeas corpus would be available to
protect the ward against the commissioner's improper use of his other guardi-
anship powers. (As to the possible relevance of the federal Civil Rights Act,
see 78 HARv. L. REv. 684 (1965).) The Task Force on Law suggests that the
court should not supervise the discretion of a plenary guardian, but recom-
mends that plenary guardianship be reserved for those who are "judicially
determined to be incapable of undertaking routine day-to-day decisions and
who are found to be incapable of basic self-management." TASK FORCE ON
LAW 25.
In any event, habeas corpus is not likely to be an effective, or even an
available, remedy for a substantial percentage of the commissioner's wards:
the scope of inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings is limited, see State ex rel.
Anderson v. United States Veterans Hosp., supra at 223, 128 N.W.2d at 718;
most of the commissioner's wards do not seek and cannot afford an inde-
pendent attorney. The commissioner's staff can recall only one effort in recent
years to obtain judicial review of the commissioner's use of his guardianship
powers. In re Silbert, Ramsey County District Court, Civ. No. 329188, Minn.,
July 26, 1968, involved a five year-old ward who had been left in his mother's
custody following commitment. When the county welfare department forcibly
removed the ward, his mother filed a writ of habeas corpus. The welfare
department moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that commitment gave the
commissioner sole discretion to determine who should have physical custody
of his ward. The trial judge postponed decision of the motion, and held, on
the merits, that the child's best interests warranted removing him from his
mother's custody. Interview With Allen H. Aaron, Esq., in Minneapolis, July
25, 1963.
60. MiNN. STAT. § 525.78(1) (1961); see, e.g., Masters v. State, 216 Minn.
553, 13 N.W.2d 487 (1944). Restoration is delayed 80 days if someone other
than the commissioner petitions. MNr. STAT. § 525.78(2) (1961).
61. Mmn. STAT. § 525.78(4) (1961).
62. MAnq. STAT. § 525.611 (1961). This section was added in 1955 to the
private guardianship provisions. The commitment provisions also contain a
discharge section which does not include the second clause quoted in the
text. Mum. STAT. § 525.78(5) (1961).
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termination for lengthy periods - not always to accomplish goals
germane to the retardation program. In one case, a county case-
worker first reported that a female ward had made an adequate
community adjustment in 1953; although the caseworker recom-
mended discharge, and no adverse reports were subsequently re-
ceived, the ward was not discharged until June, 1963. In another
case, a 16 year-old boy was committed and immediately institu-
tionalized in September, 1960; a week later, the institution psy-
chologist reported that he was not mentally retarded. Although
the boy was never diagnosed as retarded, and although the com-
missioner's staff made regular efforts to have the boy restored,
the county did not file a petition until May, 1963. During the win-
ter of 1962, the boy was placed with a relative on a trial basis;
when the arrangement proved unsuccessful, the county returned
the boy to the institution. One of the institution's caseworkers
explained:
We do not want - discharged until some definite and suitable plan
for supervision can be worked out....
We realize that - is not testing in the mentally deficient range;
however, he is in need of supervision, protection and guidance. We do
not feel we would recommend discharge from guardianship until a sub-
stitute plan can be devised to meet these needs. - has been under
guardianship for almost 2 years and we do not see any emergency in
discharging guardianship if such action may do more harm than good. 4
Once again, these cases may not be typical. But the commis-
sioner's files suggest that wards have not often sought independent
counsel, relying instead on the advice of local caseworkers; and
few guardianships have been terminated without the active coop-
eration of the county welfare department. When the commissioner
makes even incomplete surveys of those under guardianship, a
great number of discharge or restoration petitions are immedi-
ately filed. The last such survey resulted in seven hundred dis-
charge petitions." Even if termination is not always administered
63. File 9 4, June 4, 1963. On the following dates the county welfare
department had contacts with the ward; on each occasion, the caseworker
reported either that the ward was continuing her excellent adjustment or
failed to comment adversely: Aug. 10, 1951 (situation "ideal" for termination);
July 9, 1955; Dec. 28, 1956; Feb. 14, 1958 (stable and good family; "doing
amazingly well"; should be considered for restoration); April 1, 1960 (no
recommendation of discharge because ward may have more children); April 4,
1963 (ward does not want to take I.Q. test; recommend discharge).
64. File 9 5, June 6, 1962.
65. Coakley-Bengston Interview. Miss Thomson reported a three year
survey of wards which ended in 1948 with the filing of 605 discharge peti-
tions: "While the accomplishment of this survey did not mean that active
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in this fashion, however, the fact remains, that some wards who
were eligible for restoration or discharge have been subjected to
the commissioner's supervisory powers.
II.
In fiscal 1962-1963, 464 persons were committed to the guard-
ianship of the commissioner of public welfare; these commitments
brought the total under guardianship as of July 1, 1963, to 10,985.
Despite the size of this group, if common projections of the total
retarded population are acceptable, most of Minnesota's mentally
deficient have not been committed. One study group concluded,
for example, that 102,416 retarded persons resided in the state in
1960." The commissioner does not actively seek retardates who
need a guardian. As the total number of wards suggests, however,
retarded persons and their families are constantly arriving at the
local welfare departments by all the diverse routes travelled by
social problems on their way to initial or resumed public concern.
An intake interview (the initial contact with the retarded person
or someone interested in him) does not lead ineluctably to com-
mitment. At any stage of the casework process, alternative courses
are available to the caseworker and to the retardate or his family.
Nonetheless, county welfare department policies may be critical
in determining who among the retarded population will become
wards of the commissioner: handicapped persons and their fami-
lies, having sought the welfare department's guidance, are often
motivated to follow its suggestions; the department can file its
own petition; and if a petition is filed, it is highly probable that
the subject of the petition will become a ward.U Because welfare
department officials are so influential, the criteria they utilize in
selecting retardates for guardianship provide an appropriate back-
ground against which to sketch the commitment process.
Although any premise as to proper state guardianship policies
is likely to be controversial, one assumption seems warranted:
guardianship should not be utilized for every person who may for
some purpose be classified as "retarded." Administrative problems
supervision would or could be given every ward, it did mean that we knew
more about them, and about what should be done." THomsoN 139.
The commissioner's files also indicate that the county welfare depart-
ments apply the definition of "mentally deficient person" much more rigor-
ously for purpose of restoration than they have in seeking commitment.
Cf. notes 110-25 infra and accompanying text.
66. See MInN. GovERNoR's ADvisoRy Counr. ON MENTAL RETARDATION,
REPORT 6 (1962).
67. See text accompanying notes 110-25 and 234-58 infra.
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alone probably make a more liberal policy impractical. Moreover,
the legislature seems to have contemplated some selectivity: the
legislative history of the 1917 act refers to "mentally subnormal
children whose presence in the community is a serious public men-
ace . . ."" and the statute now authorizes guardianship only for
the person who is "so mentally defective as to require supervision,
control, or care for his own or the public welfare."(" With a few
important exceptions, the commissioner now strongly supports a
selective commitment policy. The basic goals of the retardation
program -maximum development of the retardate's capacities
and his adequate adjustment in the community - can usually be
obtained without guardianship. A variety of resources - foster
care, medical and psychiatric consultation, casework support,
even institutional training - should be freely available to re-
tarded persons without commitment. Guardianship should be
utilized only if the welfare department must exercise some meas-
ure of "authority" to accomplish the program's goals. It may be
necessary to compel conduct by the retardate, to coerce the
cooperation of his family or other members of the community, or
"to accomplish therapeutic purposes authoritatively when other
measures have failed."70 In short, guardianship should be estab-
lished with reticence.
But the commissioner's current policies do not fairly describe
the guardianship program - because the county welfare depart-
ments still subscribe to views which were universal- and which
were promoted by the commissioner's staff - until a few years
ago." County officials usually recommend guardianship for every
68. Minn. Child Welfare Comm'n, Report 11-12 (1917). See THoMsoN 17:
"This [guardianship] provision had been included in the law as passed, but
the reason for it-fear that the feebleminded would become a social menace
-was fortunately omitted."
69. Mmn. STAT. § 525.749(6) (1961). Hereafter, this definitional pro-
vision is quoted without footnote citation.
70. Coakley Interview, July 7, 1963. These views parallel the recommenda-
tions of the President's Panel. See TASK FoRcE ON LAw 17-18.
71. Miss Thomson was the supervisor of the Section for Mentally Deficient
and Epileptic from 1924 to 1959. She reported: "The philosophy of basing the
amount of service given by social agencies on an early readiness of the client
for self-responsibility was becoming accepted as I left; it seems to me to bear
out my concern for attitudes toward the mentally retarded." THomsoN 234.
She was influential in the founding of the Minnesota Association for Re-
tarded Children and shared the views of that organization. See text accom-
panying note 77 infra. Finally, she was one of the authors of the DPW
Manual which, although it first appeared in 1959, reflects almost none of the
commissioner's present policies. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 75 & 138
infra.
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retarded person - emphasizing (at least prior to commitment)
the "protective" nature of guardianship rather than its "author-
ity" aspects. Even if his family is currently providing the retar-
date with adequate protection, guardianship is useful as an "insur-
ance policy" which assures him "long term closeness" with the
agency. In any future emergency, the welfare department will
know the retardate and his problems and will be able to provide
him immediate and complete protection. The counties also focus
on custodial care for retardates in institutions; this traditional ap-
proach to long-term care for the retarded is, incidentally, to the
counties' financial advantage.72
One illustration should suffice to suggest the differences in com-
mitment practice which the counties' views produce. In a recent
case, the behavior of a 19 year-old youth had caused family and
community concern. The youth's mother petitioned to establish
guardianship after a conversation with a Hennepin County case-
worker; the caseworker reported:
This [decision to petition] all happened after we discussed what might
be possible for - in view of the problems he might be presenting.
It appeared that some of the things that we could offer would only be
available after guardianship, such as boarding home or institutional
placement. Mrs. - seemed to be very agreeable to this. She seemed
to take satisfaction in that something could be done.7
The commissioner's policy is that foster care and institutionaliza-
tion should both be available without commitment. Yet the su-
pervisor of the Hennepin County Mental Retardation Unit stated
that the county uniformly requires guardianship prior to the re-
tardate's placement in foster care; the commissioner's policies are
irrelevant, the supervisor added, because the county bears the
entire cost of foster care and is entitled to establish its own stand-
ards without interference from the Department of Public Welfare
(DPW).u
The commissioner's staff is engaged in a continuing program to
persuade the county welfare departments of the wisdom of his
policies; but the task is not an easy one. In the first place, the
DPW Manual reflects the counties' views. It lists as one of "seven
72. See text accompanying notes 129-32 infra.
73. File # 6, July 10, 1963.
74. Interview With Miss Alice Dumas Smith, Supervisor of the Mental
Retardation Unit of the Hennepin County Welfare Department, in Minne-
apolis, Dec. 6, 1968. But cf. MnN-. STAT. § 393.07(l)(c) (1961): "A county
welfare board shall make the services of its public child welfare program
available as required by . . . the commissioner . . . ."
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reasons for guardianship . . . , any one of which may make such
action advisable," the parents' need for consultation or aid "in
planning for and caring for retarded or epileptic children ... ."7
This suggestion would obviously expand the group for which the
commissioner considers guardianship appropriate. There are pre-
cious few parents of retardates who do not need such consultation
or aid. The commissioner's staff assert that Manual statements
should not be taken at face value70 -but the Manual has been
influential. In addition, a number of special interest groups reject
the commissioner's policies; they consider state guardianship to
be the nucleus of the state's retardation program, and vehemently
oppose any DPW effort to limit the number of retardates eligible
for commitment. The local chapters of the National Association
for Retarded Children (NARC) urge their parent members to take
advantage of state guardianship.7 In 1958, an Advisory Board on
Handicapped, Gifted, and Exceptional Children urged commit-
ment of "all trainable individuals at an early age, regardless of
whether or not the child is living at home and attending public
schools."7 Because the commissioner assumes that some retar-
dates do not need the "protection" of state guardianship, his poli-
cy has incurred the disapproval of those who perceive a legislative
and administrative tendency to discriminate in favor of programs
for the "curable" handicapped.79 Finally, inertia alone has de-
terred acceptance of the commissioner's policy; for 40 years the
commissioner's staff promoted what are still the counties' prac-
tices. In the future, perhaps, the commissioner's policies will be
implemented; the fact that for the years 1961-1963 annual com-
mitment totals remained stable, suggests that at least some of the
counties have not yet modified their practices.
The commissioner would find it difficult to compel acceptance
of his policy. His staff is usually informed of a county's intention
to establish guardianship only when the probate court serves
notice that the hearing will be held in 10 days; although the
75. DPW Mar.uAL 6; see id. at 7: "Guardianship is usually needed before
... [foster] placement is planned."
76. Coakley Interview, July 7, 1963. The DPW Manual was designed, in
part, as a public relations device to encourage the establishment of guardian-
ship. Ibid.
77. Interview With Gerald Walsh, Executive Director of the Minnesota
Association for Retarded Children, in Minneapolis, July 18, 1963.
78. Advisory Board on Handicapped, Gifted and Exceptional Children,
Report-The Trainable Retarded Child in Minnesota 18 (June, 1958).
79. See THousoN 234.
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county welfare department sends DPW a "referral history,"so it
is difficult for the state office to prevent a commitment on such
short noticeOs The commissioner's staff is not large enough to
expect a careful review of every referral history received; it would
certainly be impossible for the state office to verify the conclu-
sions of the history or to negotiate with the family, the county
welfare department, or the probate court. (Hennepin and Ramsey
counties, which account for a large percentage of the commit-
ments, have not been subjected even to this minimal supervision;
due to a mistaken reading of the statute, neither county sends
referral histories to DPW prior to commitment.)82 In any event,
an effort by the commissioner to influence probate court decisions
might not be successful; in one recent case an epileptic boy was
committed in Hennepin County despite a plea at the hearing by
the director of the DPW Children's Mental Health Service (a
psychiatrist) that the boy was not eligible for guardianship. 3 The
commissioner encourages the counties to seek advice from his
staff before a petition is filed. When DPW has recommended
against guardianship in one of these "evaluation cases," its advice
has usually been followed." But this procedure is utilized in a
very small percentage of the cases. Once guardianship has been
established, the commissioner is not completely free to obtain the
ward's restoration - occasionally because the county attorney
threatens to oppose the petition."8
II.
Any attempt to describe a decision-making process is hazard-
ous. Yet a discussion of the establishment of guardianship must
include an outline of the circumstances, social or personal, of the
80. The "referral history" is the report of the county's investigation of
the patient which is prepared for the probate court's use. See text accom-
panying notes 29-30 supra.
81. Coakley Interview, July 7, 1968.
82. Ibid. The commissioner's staff had interpreted Mmi. STAT. §
525.752(1) (1961)- giving the probate courts in counties containing cities
of the first class discretion to order referral histories-to apply to county
welfare department reports to the commissioner. When the error was pointed
out, the commissioner's staff indicated that they planned to require reports
from Hennepin and Ramsey counties in the future.
88. File # 7, July 20, 1962; see text following note 211 infra.
84. Coakley Interview, July 7, 1963; see text accompanying note 158 infra.
85. See text accompanying notes 61, 63-65 supra. In File # 8, the county
attorney objected to restoration of a ward who had not tested in the mentally
deficient range since 1949. See note 56 supra and accompanying text. When
the commissioner petitioned, the county attorney warned that it would be
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retardates who are likely to become wards of the commissioner.
The impressions reported below were gathered from several
sources: interviews with county personnel and the commission-
er's staff (their attitudes should reflect - with some distortion,
perhaps - the way they handle their caseloads); personal obser-
vation of probate court hearings; a review of a limited number of
casework files. 6
A. ".. . MENTALLY DEFECTIVE....".
1. The Commissioner's Policy and the Counties' Practices
Only a "mentally deficient person" may appropriately be made
a ward of the commissioner. The intellectual element of the term
is not described with precision: a mentally deficient person is
someone "other than a mentally ill person," who is "mentally de-
fective." Yet it is clear that some degree of intellectual impair-
ment was to be a "jurisdictional" prerequisite to commitment.
Intelligence level also plays a vital role in the commissioner's
selective commitment program: need for protection and super-
vision are often correlative with intellectual achievement and
potential. 7
Both the 1917 law and the 1935 Probate Code permitted judi-
cial delineation of the content of the intelligence criterion: com-
necessary for a member of the commissioner's staff "to be here in person and
testify and be subject to cross-examination." No appearance was entered for
the commissioner and the petition was denied. File # 8, June 11, 1968.
86. No effort has been made to achieve statistical precision. In the course
of this study, I attended more than 20 commitment hearings (all of them in
Iamsey and Hennepin counties), and read either the county welfare depart-
ment's or the commissioner's file on each of them; I interviewed some 25 per-
sons who take part or have an active professional interest in Minnesota's re-
tardation program. Finally, I read the commissioner's complete file on some
20 additional wards; the files were chosen by the commissioner's staff to illus-
trate specific aspects of the state guardianship program- e.g., institutional-
ization, sterilization, a ward's marriage. Needless to say, the impressions left
by these files may not be representative; but the information provided by the
persons interviewed, the commitment hearings attended, and the written
material on the program, were all consistent with these impressions. Some
of the conclusions reported here were reached in a similarly impressionistic
study of the guardianship program conducted under the auspices of the
United States Public Welfare Association. Although the report of this study
could not be found, Miss Thomson reported: "[The report] '. . . was more
than critical -it was devastating . . . . Dr. Kirkpatrick [the investigator]
disapproved of a guardianship law, indicating that its administration was
responsible for the large waiting list [for institutional placement] . . . . He
stated that supervision in Minnesota existed mainly on paper." TiomsoN 127.
87. Coakley Interview, July 7, 1963.
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mitment hearings could be held without the aid of a board of
examiners if the individual was found to be "obviously feeble-
minded."" Qualified psychologists were not available for commit-
ment hearings in the rural counties and behavioral data was con-
sidered relevant. Dr. Kuhlmann informed the probate judges that
"obvious feeble-mindedness" could be proved by such evidence
as: "(1) physical appearance; (2) opinions of relatives; (3) opinion
in community; and (4) observations on the acquisitions and abil-
ity to do the ordinary things of everyday life, which may in part
be tested directly on the child."" No doctrinal development oc-
curred. Certainly, no one should mourn the absence of a body of
doctrine adopting Dr. Kuhlmann's analysis of the reliability of
"opinion in community."90 How helpful his other categories were,
or how they fared in probate court hearings, is unknown.
Currently, intelligence is measured by one or more of the stand-
ard I.Q. tests. The counties usually order a test whenever a person
who might be retarded comes to their attention.9 I.Q. tests pos-
sess a special magic. A low score usually influences the caseworker
to urge the parents to petition, and is often determinative when
the welfare department must decide whether to file its own peti-
tion. Regardless of surrounding circumstances, the lower the per-
son's I.Q., the more likely it is that a petition will be filed. The
probate judges have also relied (or purported to rely) to an aston-
ishing degree on the fragile certainty of an I.Q. score. In one case,
for example, a 10 year-old girl was committed, despite a month-
old adjudication that she was not feebleminded, because a "recent
mental test ... said had deteriorated by about 4 or 5 points
88. See Minn. Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 344, § 6; Pearson, Guardianship and
Commitments Under the Probate Code, 20 Mmu. L. REv. 333, 345 (1936).
89. Kuhlmann, Determination of Feeble-Mindedness as Related to the
Courts 6 (address to the State Association of Probate Judges, Jan. 15, 1920)
[hereinafter cited as Kublmann].
90.
Common denial of feeble-mindedness is no proof of normality, but
only very good evidence that the case is not a very low grade of feeble-
mindedness. Usually when the neighbors are agreed that the case is
not very bright, that he is a little odd, peculiar, and so on, but not so
bad as to be called feeble-minded, the case will be found, on special
examination, to belong to the high grade imbecile, or low grade moron
class. The reasons for these facts need no detailed discussion. They are
the deductions from common observations that reveal their own expla-
nations. ...
Id. at 7.
91. DPW MruAL 11. Very infrequently, if the family refuses to cooperate,
the county may file a petition so that the probate judge can order testing.
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in her IQ."" DPW files indicate that time and again a low I.Q.
score has been considered conclusive evidence that the person
was "mentally defective."
More than 40 years ago, Dr. Kuhlmann formulated standards
for determining the intellectual impairment requirement:
We may safely put the lower limit at .70, and the upper limit at .85.
I myself, practice putting the lower limit at .75. . . . The first practical
and very important conclusion we arrive at is then, that, if the court
... finds the intelligence to be below .70 or above .85, this result alone
may be taken as conclusive. .. . This applies to children as well as to
adults.93
His formulation needs very little alteration to describe current
attitudes and practices.
2. The Counties' Practices Assessed
Even at the time Dr. Kuhlmann wrote, the available data
should probably have suggested the dangers of relying solely on
I.Q. scores for the establishment of guardianship. Dr. Kuhlmann's
thesis was that persons who test below 75 ". . . will not be able
permanently to make an independent honest living, without su-
pervision and guardianship, under any and all circumstances they
are likely to meet in their lives."94 His argument assumed that
current I.Q. scores could be projected for extended periods. But
Dr. Kuhlmann recognized that "for a very few [defective children,
the intelligence quotient] . . . increases, and in very, very rare
instances it increases enough in time to take a child out of the
class of mentally defective and place him in the class of normal.""
Today, psychologists seem sure that I.Q. scores cannot be used
with reliability for prediction: "Even for the non-institutional
group, school and agency judgments of retardates rendered dur-
ing the formative years are often belied by the retardate's per-
formance in adulthood - delayed though it may be.""
92. File Z 2, March 11, 1945. The probate judge was probably primarily
interested in other aspects of this case. See notes 184-85 infra and accompany-
ing text.
93. Kublmann 15. (Emphasis from original.)
94. Ibid. For further discussion of this remark, see text following note
173 infra.
95. Kuhlmann 14. Dr. Kublmann suggested that restoration or discharge
was designed to take care of such cases. But this obviously ignores the interest
in protecting "wards" from the commissioner's use of his extensive authority.
96. Ober, Some Aspects on Legal Guardianship for the Adult Mentally
Retarded, 68 AMERICAN J. MENTAL DEFIcIENCY 15, 21-22 (1963); see
Br~oonr, STABiLrY AND CHANGE IN HUATAN CuARACTERISTICS 88 (1964).
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Nor are I.Q. scores necessarily reliable indicators of a person's
current intellectual capacity. 7 The commissioner's files contain
numerous examples of discrepant results for tests administered
within reasonably short time intervals by examiners whose com-
petance was not questioned: (a) 71-86-92; (b) 71-69-88-76;
(c) 58-76; (d) 73-78-84-99-81-86-84; (e) 58-68-70-71-62."' The
causes of these fluctuations may include socio-cultural factors,
reading handicaps, anxiety caused by the testing situation, and
emotional instability." Exhaustive exploration of the causes is
unnecessary; it suffices that substantial I.Q. variations can occur.
When the legislature authorizes local welfare departments to in-
terfere with parental prerogatives, and permits possibly life-long
deprivations of individual discretion, a single I.Q. score should
certainly not be a sufficient jurisdictional showing.
"I.Q.ism" has had other unfortunate consequences. The statute
defines as "mentally deficient" any person, "other than a mentally
ill person, . . . [who is] mentally defective." The mentally ill must
be differentiated. Because a person's I.Q. score may be inaccur-
ately depressed during periods of emotional turmoil, however, the
welfare departments have been encouraged to ignore the cate-
gorization problem. In one recent case, for example, a 16 year-old
boy was committed and immediately institutionalized after proof
that his I.Q. was 84, that he had an "emotionally unstable person-
ality," and that the University Hospital had diagnosed his con-
dition as "chronic brain syndrome of unknown cause." 00 After a
week in the institution he scored 99 on another I.Q. test. Six
weeks later, the institution psychologist commented:
On the basis of the present test findings . . . we are led to conclude
that - is not a mentally deficient person and that lack of intellect-
97. See generally HUNT, INTELLIGENcE AND ExPRENcE (1961); MAsLAND,
SARASON & GLADwiN, MENTAL SuBNORMAL=rY 278-310 (1958).
98. The files from which these scores were taken, listed in their order in
the text, are as follows: (a) File 9 8, Oct. 18, 1961-Oct. 22, 1962; (b) File 4 9,
undated test (approx. 1950)-June, 1959; (c) File 3 6, April 25, 1960-Sept. 5,
1963; (d) File t 5, Jan. 11, 1960-Feb. 3, 1960; (e) File , 10, 1936-June 25, 1963.
99. See, e.g., BLOOM, op. cit. supra note 96, at 89: "Much more research
is needed to develop precise descriptions . . . of environments as they relate
to the development of intelligence.. . . However, a conservative estimate of
the effect of extreme environments on intelligence is about 20 I.Q. points."
File . 11 involved a girl of Mexican origin whose family changed residences so
frequently that she had been able to obtain very little formal education.
Although she was committed as mentally deficient, see text accompanying
notes 215-20 infra, she had received a score of 99 on the performance scale
alone; her scores on the verbal scale were consistently lower. See File # 11,
Feb. 26, 1959.
100. File # 5, Feb. 11, 1960.
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ual resources has not played an important role in his poor school and
social adjustment. Rather we see the following as major variables in
this adjustment pattern:
1. has a very obvious reading handicap ....
2. This boy's family background has been one of considerable dis-
harmony, instability and friction. The father has been out of the home
for long periods of time and the parents have been . . . divorced.
3. The death of close relatives, especially his twin sister, has appar-
ently influenced - toward impulsive, self-gratifying behavior ....
4. . . . [E]vidence of brain damage ... was revealed .... It is very
possible that 's reading disability is caused by some central dis-
function of the nervous system ... .101
In many cases, evidence of emotional difficulties which may have
affected the I.Q. test results has not been sought; in other cases
such evidence has been ignored.'02 It is clear that most of the pro-
bate judges have made no effort to distinguish the retarded from
the mentally ill in the difficult cases.
An argument might be made that in determining eligibility for
a "social welfare" program, difficult problems of categorization
can be ignored. It may be impossible to differentiate the hyper-
activity which accompanies some congenital brain injuries - al-
though the person's I.Q. may be high0 3 - from the behavioral
consequences of other types of intellectual deficiency; and it is
never easy to distinguish between some types of mental illness
and retardation. Moreover, prognosis and appropriate treatment
methods for some of these conditions may be identical. The guard-
ianship statute could be expanded judicially to include any per-
son, regardless of the category in which his organic or emotional
condition should be placed, whose behavior and treatment needs
resemble those of "mentally defective" persons. Although there
is no evidence that Minnesota probate judges have consciously
101. Id. Dec. 15, 1960; see text accompanying note 64 supra.
102. See File # 10. A 38 year-old man, who had always led a sheltered
life with his parents, was committed when his low I.Q. (62 at the hearing)
was established. Yet a University of Minnesota Hospital diagnosis, completed
six weeks prior to the hearing and presented to the probate court with the
referral history, described the man as psychotic. Id. Aug. 9, 1963. The par-
ents were present at the hearing, however, and testified that their son was
"mentally deficient." In File # 9 a ward committed after he stabbed a school-
mate was later diagnosed as psychotic.
103. "[Brain-injured child] ... implies a child in whom the classic motor or
neurological signs of brain injury are absent or minimal, who may be of any
I.Q., but who displays some or all of the following: hyperactivity, destructive-
ness, distractibility, emotional instability and special learning difficulties,.
most usually perceptual or conceptual." NEw YORK STATE JOINT LEGISLATIVE




engaged in such an endeavor, the technique is not unknown. Yet
the scope of the commissioner's powers as guardian, and even a
limited survey of the use which the counties have occasionally
made of those powers, argue persuasively that the guardianship
provisions should be narrowly interpreted -leaving jurisdiction-
al choices to the legislature. If a ward could rely upon post-
commitment procedural safeguards, perhaps the issue would be
more difficult to resolve. But the establishment of guardianship
authorizes the commissioner to impose a wide range of sanctions
(any other term ignores some of the commissioner's powers) at
his discretion without concurrent judicial review. Under the cir-
cumstances judicial expansion of the statute's coverage is difficult
to justify.
B. ". . . TO REQUIRE SUPERVISION, CONTROL ....
1. The Commissioner's Policies and the Counties' Practices -
The Legislative Standard
The 1917 act seemed to include in the definition of a "feeble-
minded person" two discrete elements: one intellectual and the
other behavioral or environmental. To commit a person to the
commissioner's guardianship, the probate court had to find him
"so mentally defective as to be incapable of managing himself
and his affairs, and to require supervision, control and care for his
own or the public welfare."' 04 In 1944, after the Probate Code
had eliminated the definition of "mentally deficient person," the
Supreme Court of Minnesota supplied its own "behavioral" cri-
terion. In re Mastersi'5 involved an adult ward's petition to be
restored to capacity. The probate and district courts had denied
the petition because the ward's I.Q. was 64. The supreme court
reversed, holding that the lower courts had utilized an improper
standard. The court adopted a "sociolegal" definition of feeble-
mindedness: "While psychological tests are convenient tools for
indicating mental retardation, test results alone should ordinarily
not be considered sufficient, much less conclusive, except at lower
levels." 06 Since the ward was a "borderline case" - because her
I.Q. was between 60 and 70 -the final diagnosis should have
rested on "social history." The court commented:
The statement frequently made that all persons with I.Q.'s below 70
are feebleminded is not justified, either from the scientific or a practical
point of view. Intelligence is made up of too many factors to permit
104. Minn Sess. Laws 1917, ch. 844, § 1.
105. 216 Minn. 558, 13 N.W.2d 487 (1944).
106. Id. at 565, 18 N.W.2d at 498.
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of such a dogmatic statement. Intelligence tests are not substitutes for
insight and common sense. ....
Most intelligence tests . . . make no attempt to evaluate such ad-
mittedly important attributes as personality or moral character, but are
concerned only with the abstract aspects of thinking and reasoning.
But intelligence, by the generally accepted definition, is the ability to
meet and solve new problems, and many factors besides brain power
enter into that.lor
Three years later, the legislature revived the old definition, elim-
inating only the "managing himself and his affairs" element of the
1917 provision."es
The current definition - like the original - seems to direct
attention to the individual retardate and his problems of adjust-
ment. Evidence of his surroundings, circumstances, and previous
behavior would certainly be important; an attempt to predict his
future development and conduct would also seem appropriate, if
not dispositive. According to the commissioner, a welfare depart-
ment's decision to seek guardianship should be governed by con-
siderations similar to those which the probate court would utilize
in determining that the retardate "requires supervision."1on Thus,
if a retardate conducts himself properly in the community and
acquiesces to the treatment program -recommended for him, the
commissioner would not favor the establishment of guardianship;
retardation program goals can be achieved without the use of
"authority." Similarly, the probate court should hesitate to com-
mit this retardate to guardianship; there is no evidence that he
currently "requires supervision." But guardianship has been estab-
lished for such retardates - because the statutory language has
been ignored by the county welfare departments, by the probate
courts, and, occasionally, even by the commissioner."o
That the behavioral criterion has not appreciably limited the
group subject to state guardianship is suggested by the treatment
accorded two variables among all the circumstances which might
be relevant to such a criterion - the retardate's age, and the
wishes of his parents. The first should be an important element of
a need of supervision criterion; the second, although relevant,
should not be considered dispositive.
107. Id. at 564-65, 13 N.W.2d at 493.
108. See Mfinn. Sess. Laws 1947, ch. 622, § 1.
109. Coaldey Interview, July 7, 1963.
110. Once again the Manual's instructions are inconsistent with the
commissioner's policies: "The higher grade retarded person may make a
satisfactory adjustment indefinitely if his environment conforms to his abil-
ities. Nevertheless, guardianship may be an advantage because it will provide
continuity of supervision in spite of changing circumstances." DPW
MANAL 7.
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(a) The Retardate's Age
If guardianship is to be established selectively, the retardate's
age cannot be ignored."' The commissioner believes that as the
retardate grows older it becomes more likely that guardianship
will be appropriate: other devices to protect or control him-
such as the juvenile court - become unavailable; the protection
he receives from his parents diminishes; he more frequently experi-
ences taxing exposure to the community; he might have a family
of his own to support. Of course, a probate court should not find
that a retardate "requires supervision" simply because he has
reached majority or has acquired a family; but in an assessment
of a retardate's need of supervision, his age is obviously an im-
portant datum. In the casework process preceding a petition, how-
ever, the retardate's age has almost never been considered a rele-
vant variable. The commissioner would encourage the establish-
ment of guardianship for any person over 21;112 it would be most
surprising if the counties disagreed."3 The probate courts have
not interfered.
Nor has the retardate's youth been a significant barrier to the
establishment of guardianship. Of the 464 retardates who became
wards of the commissioner during fiscal 1962-1963, 82 percent
were less than 19 years old and about 30 percent were under 5
years of age. 114 To be sure, these figures do not prove necessarily
that the welfare departments promote guardianship for youthful
111. See TASK FoRcE ON LAw 25-26. The most common distinction is
made between minors, who are subject to the "natural guardianship" of their
parents, and adults.
112. Coakley Interview, July 7, 1963.
113. The assistant executive director of the Hennepin County Welfare
Department claimed that in the last 15 years guardianship has been used
primarily for children; he doubted whether the agency would commit a person
who had already reached adulthood. Interview With Arnold Gruber, Assistant
Executive Director of Hennepin County Welfare Department, in Minneapolis,
July 25, 1963 [hereinafter cited as Gruber Interview). In fact, the county does
not hesitate to commit adults. See, e.g. File $ 10.
114. Interview With Miss Frances Coakley, Supervisor of the Section for
Mentally Deficient and Epileptic of the Minnesota Department of Public
Welfare, in St. Paul, Nov. 26, 1963. The wards' ages were as follows:







Over age 40 25
MINNESOTA GUARDIANSHIP
retardates. But other data support such a thesis: the local NARC
chapters urge new parent members to commit their retarded chil-
dren to guardianship regardless of their age,"" and parents often
join a chapter soon after retardation becomes a family problem;
doctors and professional educators of the mentally deficient uni-
formly advise the establishment of guardianship;"0e and casework-
ers tend to recommend guardianship as a matter of rote during
the initial interview." 7 The Hennepin County policy, is that no
child younger than six months, and very few children less than a
year old, should be committed to guardianship."s Of the eight
petitions granted in Hennepin County during October, 1963, how-
ever, four concerned children who had not reached their first
birthday; one child was five months old and another, afflicted
with mongolism, had been born the month before. It seems clear
that the welfare departments have not considered the retardate's
age a determinant of his need for guardianship. Nor have the
probate courts shown any disposition to regard the retardate's
age as a consideration relevant to his "need of supervision."
(b) Parental Wishes
The retardate's parents should figure prominently in the wel-
fare department's assessment of the need for state guardianship,
and in the probate court's handling of a commitment petition. If
the parents are providing the retardate with the basic necessities,
protecting him from exploitation, and controlling his behavior,
welfare department protection or control is unnecessary. On the
other hand, the retardate whose parents are inadequate is more
likely to require the commissioner's supervision."2 In short, the
parents' attitudes and behavior should be investigated with care.
But parental approval of guardianship can hardly be equated with
a finding that the retardate "requires supervision." A parent's
consent may indicate that he has no interest in the child and will
not attend to his needs; yet, the parent's petition may have other
explanations as well - especially if he has not been informed of
the scope of the commissioner's guardianship powers."o Both the
115. Interview With Gerald Walsh, Executive Director of the Minnesota
Association for Retarded Children, in Minneapolis, July 18, 1963.
116. Gruber Interview.
117. Coakley Interview, July 7, 1963.
118. Gruber Interview.
119. Coakley Interview, July 7, 1963; see text following note 184 infra.
120. The Manual, see, e.g., DPW IANuAL 10, and county caseworkers
emphasize the fact that guardianship normally does not disturb parental
1965] 849
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Manual and the counties' practices assume that parents who peti-
tion are not incapable of exercising sole supervision of their re-
tarded child. In any event, the retardate's interests are separable.
Commitment eliminates his "power of choice"; at least as the re-
tardate approaches or reaches majority, his parents' desire should
not determine such a vital issue. Indeed, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that a guardianship proceeding entailed a conflict of
interests between the parent-petitioner and her 19 year-old
daughter.' 21
Despite the "requires supervisioh" criterion, a Governor's Ad-
visory Committee on Mental Retardation recently asserted:
"When desired by parents, guardianship should always be
available." 2 2 And so it has been! The counties have uniformly
followed such a policy, and the commissioner's staff has occasion-
ally approved. Moreover, the state office does not supervise the
counties in these cases: the commissioner never opposes a commit-
ment when a parent is the petitioner,," and the counties always
encourage parental petitions. The probate courts have customari-
ly granted the petitions.
Some of the wards committed in this fashion would probably
qualify for guardianship even if the statute were properly applied.
But approving all parental petitions is hardly the most efficient
method of selecting the wards who are eligible. In fact, the prac-
tice magnifies the risk of establishing guardianship improperly:
the precommitment casework process often takes place in such an
atmosphere of emergency that in many cases the parents' consent
to guardianship may not be informed and rational. Parents are
frequently influenced to petition, for example, when a retarded
child has been causing trouble in the home and temporary foster
prerogatives. It is doubtful that most parents are told of the extent of the
commissioner's supervisory powers. See note 248 infra.
121. In re Wretlind, 225 Minn. 554, 32 N.W.2d 161 (1948). The issue was
raised in a proceeding, initiated by the parent, seeking the daughter's restora-
tion on the grounds that the original commitment was invalid. See text accom-
panying note 247 infra for a discussion of the role of the guardian ad litem.
122. MmN. GovERNoR's ADVISORY Conr. ON MENTAL RETARDATION, RE-
PoRT 58 (1962). (All capitals in original.)
123. Coakley Interview, July 7, 1963. In subsequent discussions of various
aspects of state guardianship, Miss Coakley indicated that her views had
changed -parental wishes should not be dispositive. Interview With Miss
Frances Coakley, Supervisor of Section for Mentally Deficient and Epileptic
of the Minnesota Department of Public Welfare, in St. Paul, Nov. 26, 1963.
I have not tried to discover -whether the DPW staff's practice has changed.
Even if it has, unless the counties also change, commitment practices will
remain the same. See notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text.
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care seems likely to improve the situation. In a recent Hennepin
County case, young parents agreed to guardianship for a four
year-old daughter who had been completely immobilized since
suffering a fractured skull two weeks after birth. The child had
begun to create conflicts with the other children. Only the mother
indicated approval of guardianship. The father had signed the
petition because "that's the only way we can get any help for her
- even the private homes say she has to be under guardianship."
He was opposed to guardianship because his father had been in-
voluntarily institutionalized. A caseworker reported a precom-
mitment conversation with the parents:
Mr. advised that they were not ready to sign any petition for
commitment of , however, they were interested in institutional
placement for her. I explained in detail what commitment meant and
that it was mandatory to our institutional placement in one of the
state facilities....
Mr. inquired about other facilities available and I explained
that we did have the boarding homes that we placed retarded children
in and also private institutions. I explained, however, that these were
rather expensive and Mr. - stated that they would not be able to
meet this expense and he did not in any way suggest that the county
might be of assistance to them in this respect. 24
The father was literally compelled to consent to state guardian-
ship; in its absence, he was unable to obtain adequate care for his
daughter or peace for his family. The many pressures to which
parents are subjected have not gone unnoticed; one psychiatrist
considers it part of his function as a member of the board of
examiners to make sure that parent petitioners are really in favor
of commitment.125
2. The Commissioner's Policies and the Counties' Practices -
Behavioral Considerations
Although neither the counties nor the probate courts have
treated "requires supervision" as a prerequisite to the establish-
ment of guardianship, the surroundings in which the welfare de-
partment finds the retardate, and his behavior, often influence
the casework process prior to the filing of a petition. Even if most
caseworkers recommend guardianship indiscriminately, the wel-
fare department must decide how vigorously the parents should
124. File 9 12, March 26, 1963.
125. Interview With David S. Thorsen, M.D., in St. Paul, July 15, 1963.
The pressures on the parents include the "waiting list" and the need for
foster placement. See text accompanying notes 73 supra and 199 infra.
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be urged to petition; if the parents refuse to petition, the depart-
ment must decide whether to file its own petition. The welfare
departments commonly rely upon data which the probate courts
might find relevant to a "requires supervision" criterion. Indeed,
it might be appropriate to complain that behavior, used in this
fashion, has figured too prominently in welfare department deci-
sions. Thus, a person's conduct has occasionally been used to
prove his "retardation." Referral histories reporting I.Q. scores
over 70 often contain an "explanatory" comment: ". . . the boy
is probably of normal intelligence but with the tremendous emo-
tional problems that he has had, he just hasn't been able to func-
tion anywhere near that level." 28 The Manual's instructions also
illustrate the technique:
... [Tjhere may be little problem in determining that a retarded per-
son of I.Q. 10 will need lifelong care and supervision. . . , but the de-
cision will not be so easy in the case of a person with an I.Q. in the 70's
who comes to the attention of the agency because of truancy or petty
thievery. In such a case social history data are primary to the psycho-
metric findings....
Persons in the borderline range [I.Q. 70-79] generally adjust satis-
factorily to society without coming to the attention of social agencies.
... Sometimes, however, emotional and/or personality defects added to
the borderline I.Q. cause behavior which makes the diagnosis that of
mental deilency.12 7
It does seem likely that the welfare departments' discretion to
establish guardianship in "borderline" cases is not unlimited; at
some point within the "dull-normal" range, most probate courts
would probably be unwilling to find the person "mentally defi-
cient," regardless of his behavior problems. 2s
The behavioral and environmental considerations which have
influenced the welfare departments to seek guardianship have
been numerous and varied. The following paragraphs examine a
few of the more common factual patterns.
(a) Institutional Placement
Institutional planning for a retardate, initiated either by his
family or by the welfare department, has often been the principal
126. File $ 7, July 9, 1962.
127. DPW MImuA 81-82. (Emphasis added.)
128. Two recent "referral histories" were sent, with an accompanying
questionnaire, to the guardianship caseworkers in eight representative coun-
ties. One of the cases involved a 24 year-old youth, with an I.Q. of 81, who
had been apprehended burglarizing a grain elevator. See text accompanying
notes 156-63 infra. Of the 42 respondents, only half believed that the county's
probate court would be willing to commit the youth as mentally deficient.
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reason for the establishment of guardianship. Until very recently,
for all practical purposes institutional placement could not be ar-
ranged without guardianship.x' 9 Moreover, priority for available
institutional space - the "waiting list" - was established solely
in accordance with the date on which the retardate became a ward
of the commissioner. 3 0 The counties had (and still have) a finan-
cial stake in institutional placement policies. The county bore the
cost of casework service or foster care for a retarded person; but
while a dependent retardate was institutionalized, the county's
liability for his maintenance could not exceed $80 a year.' Since
the cost of foster placement was substanitially higher, county
welfare departments tended to produce too facile recommenda-
tions that a ward needed institutional restraint or training. De-
spite some inflation in the cost of institutional care, the counties
have not lost interest in its financial advantages; the 1962 Gover-
nor's Advisory Committee suggested delicately:
If the state were to participate in meeting this cost [of foster care],
counties would then be willing to evaluate carefully the relative merits
of state institutional care versus boarding care. ... Under the present
system, the county welfare board usually elects to place the child in a
state institution, at a yearly cost to the county of no more than $120.00,
as opposed to boarding care, which can run as high as $1,800.00
per year. 3 2
The counties had good reason to seek guardianship as quickly as
possible for every retardate who came to their attention: early
establishment of guardianship did no harm, and, because the
ward's name was automatically placed on the "waiting list," it
hastened the advent of economies! The financial impetus to insti-
tutionalization probably fostered other practices inconsistent with
the commissioner's present policies; the counties' only excuse for
requiring guardianship as a prerequisite to foster home placement
was that the ward's name would be on the "waiting list" while
the county was expending funds for his benefit. Local government
parsimony and legislative myopia thus combined to encourage
the establishment of guardianship - in many cases, probably,
either improperly or unnecessarily. The 1961 legislature revised
the institutional cost of care provisions, but preserved the cost
advantages enjoyed by the counties.'
129. See DPW MAxuAL 8, 49; text accompanying note 138 infra.
130. DPW MAxuAL 22.
181. Minn Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 679, § 1; see note 142 infra and accom-
panying text.
132. Mum. GovERNoR's Anvisour CoLHmTTEE ON MENTAL RETARDATION,
REPORT 23 (1962).
133. Mum. STAT. § 252.041-.046 (1961).
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Establishing guardianship for "waiting list" purposes is no
longer consistent with the commissioner's policies. The commis-
sioner asserts that institutional space is assigned solely on the
basis of relative needs when space becomes available, regardless of
the existence of guardianship; as a result, guardianship should
never be established solely to authorize or facilitate institutional-
ization. Voluntary admission has now become a common and ap-
proved method of initiating institutional treatment,"' and the
commissioner believes that institutional facilities should be used
more frequently- for retarded persons who have not been made
wards. Although the provision has been ignored, legislation au-
thorizing voluntary institutionalization actually antedates the
guardianship law.3"5 But in 1961, the legislature clearly articulated
institutional admission standards. Guardianship was not to be a
prerequisite:
The Commissioner of public welfare may provide for the admission
to any such state school and hospital of any mentally retarded or epi-
leptic person who is a resident of this state or who may have hereto-
fore or may hereafter be committed to the guardianship of the Com-
missioner of public welfare.' 36
Yet the 1962 Governor's Advisory Committee on Mental Retar-
dation advised caution: "It is recommended that careful study
be made to determine whether some retarded individuals not
under guardianship should be admitted to institutions . . ..
The recommendation was not likely to influence the counties to
modify their guardianship policies. But it was less hostile to vol-
untary institutionalization than the position taken by the Manual:
The Commissioner has first responsibility to his wards; and until there
is space not needed by those under guardianship, voluntary entrance
would mean an injustice to those for whom the Commissioner has defi-
nite responsibility. For both the mentally deficient and the epileptic,
there is a waiting list of wards for whom space is not available.'2 8
134. See generally Linaurwx & McINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND
THE LAW 107-15 (1961).
135. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.75 (Supp. 1964).
136. MINN. STAT. § 252.03 (1961). (Emphasis added.) Not atypically, the
legislature, on the same day, amended the succeeding section to read: "All
mentally retarded persons, resident of the state, duly committed to the guar-
dianship of the commissioner of public welfare, . . . may be admitted. . . ."
Minn. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 560, § 2. This provision was repealed at a special
session of the legislature the same year. Minn. Laws, Ex. Sess. 1961, ch. 62, § 7.
137. MINN. GOVERNOR's AnvisoRY COMDwTTEE ON MENTAL RETARDA-
TIoN, REPORT 58 (1962). (All capitals in original.)
138. DPW MAwusAL 49. Miss Thomson indicated that one of the reasons
for the "waiting list" was to deter political and other pressures on the insti-
tutions to obtain placement in individual cases. See THompsoN 25-26.
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The argument involves some serious question-begging. It is only
unfair to admit nonwards if the sole purpose of guardianship is to
place retardates on a "waiting list"; otherwise, voluntary institu-
tionalization will modify the expectations of wards, perhaps, but
the practice does them no "injustice." On the other hand, the
commissioner's "responsibility" to those retarded persons who
have been made wards solely to be placed on the "waiting list"
seems much less substantial.
The Hennepin County Welfare Department continues to as-
sume that institutional space is assigned according to the date
guardianship was established. 39 The caseworkers urge families to
file a petition as soon as possible for that reason; and every peti-
tion includes a statement that one of the purposes to be served
by guardianship is placement of the ward's name on the "waiting
list." It is likely that Hennepin County's practice is not unique.140
Why the practice persists, however, is not at all clear. The com-
missioner has ultimate control of institutional placements.14' More-
over, the legislature's cost of care policies give the county a cost
advantage even if the institutionalized retardate is not the com-
missioner's ward.'42 "Waiting list" commitments may be explained
by inertia. It is also possible that the counties are anxious to influ-
ence the commissioner either to return to a "waiting list" policy
- allowing the counties to institutionalize a larger percentage of
their dependent retarded population - or to agree more readily
to institutionalizing some individual ward for whose care the
county does not want to assume responsibility. This much is cer-
tain: to the extent some pro forma check must regularly be made
of all wards, burgeoning numbers preclude adequate casework
service to those wards who need it,"' and retarded persons (and
their families) are being misled as to the necessity of guardianship
139. Gruber Interview. Mr. Gruber was aware that DPW may have modi-
fled its placement policy, but the counties had not been officially informed of
the change.
140. The Manual, of course, incorporates the "waiting list" policy. DPW
MALNUAL 22. Half of the 42 caseworkers who responded to a questionnaire,
see note 128 supra, believed that institutional placement was based solely on
a "waiting list"; 11 of the remainder believed that the "waiting list" was a
relevant factor in assigning institutional space.
141. MsN. STAT. § 252.025 (1961).
142. Mum. STAT. § 252.041(4) (1961); MNm. STAT. ANN. § 252.045
(Supp. 1964).
143. Coakley-Bengston Interview; Interview With Miss Irma Craven,
Caseworker of the Hennepin County Welfare Department, in Minneapolis,
Aug. 8, 1963; See DPW MAANuAL 20 (contacts should be planned at least every




- perhaps to their disadvantage in some future emergency.
Manual modifications and other rigorous endeavors to reform lo-
cal practice are obviously essential.
To be sure, voluntary institutionalization is not devoid of risks.
Indeed, assuring the "voluntariness" of an institutional place-
ment is just as important as protecting the interests of long-term
institutional inmates."' But in Minnesota, voluntary institution-
alization deprives the retardate of no judicial safeguards he would
enjoy in the commitment process under present conditions; 45 and if
he has been made the commissioner's ward, the statute apparently
authorizes his institutionalization at the commissioner's discre-
tion. If the retardate is institutionalized voluntarily, however, he
may be in a better position. He can test the propriety of his con-
tinued detention at any time by demanding release; and the com-
mitment proceeding will then take place in a context which makes
it difficult to ignore the importance of the decision.140 Moreover,
the retardate may be released from the institution without com-
mitment to guardianship, avoiding the possibility of life-long
status as a ward of the commissioner.
(b) Use of Authority
"Authoritative casework" - the social work approximation of
parental supervision - is a useful technique for dealing with
problems of the retarded.'4 7 The commissioner recognizes that the
most important consideration in the determination of a retardate's
need for guardianship is the extent to which authority will be
needed as a therapeutic or protective device. According to the
Manual, among the "situations ... in which guardianship is most
often needed" is the following:
Authority may be needed in order to help the boy or girl or the man
or woman who has become delinquent or is unable to adjust satisfactor-
ily in the home or community. Supervision may mean changing en-
144. See generally, LnAuAN & McINTYRE, op. cit. supra note 134.
145. For a description of what have been described as "typical" com-
mitment hearings, see text acompanying notes 284-58 infra.
146. See MmN. STAT. Aiw. § 525.75 (Supp. 1964). The superintendent
must release the person within three days of a written demand for release
unless the superintendent files a petition seeking the person's commitment. It
is true that the person may be no more sophisticated about demanding re-
lease than he is likely to be about seeking habeas corpus. See note 59 supra.
But at least he has avoided the commissioner's supervision during the period
prior to his institutionalization.
147. Coakley Interview, July 7, 1963.
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vironmental factors such as family relationships. Institutional training
is also often needed.' 48
Complete exploration of the commissioner's powers is unneces-
sary. It is sufficient that he enjoys some quantum of authority,
and guardianship has been established principally to permit its
use. Thus, a petition has occasionally been filed soon after the
announcement of a retardate's intention to marry."'s In the past,
a decision to arrange a ward's sterilization has also led to the
establishment of guardianship.
Even if no immediate need for the use of authority appears,
the fact that the commissioner's powers will be available probably
influences the county welfare departments to seek guardianship
in some cases. There is no question that the counties have made
use of the commissioner's extensive powers to control his wards.
Even if postcommitment procedural safeguards were available,
it seems clear that many wards could not be adequately shielded
from the commissioner's capricious use of his powers. Certainly,
in the absence of effective postcommitment safeguards, the com-
mitment hearing should provide protections commensurate with
the risks which guardianship poses for the ward. Under present
conditions, however, the probate courts are authorizing the com-
missioner's use of his supervisory authority whether or not the
ward appears to "require supervision."
(c) Sexual Misconduct
Sexual exploits by retardates have often signalled the begin-
ning of intensive welfare department efforts to obtain guardian-
ship. The casework premises of this practice were provided by
Dr. Kuh1mann:
[Mental defectives] . .. lack common sense, judgment and insight into
moral situations. They do not comprehend the wrongness of immoral
acts, do not forsee consequences, and above all, they have not the will
power to resist temptation.... This tendency is nowhere more strik-
ing than in the sex-offenses of mentally defective girls ... .150
Although the welfare departments would no longer accept the
logic of Dr. Kuhlmann's argument, their practice has not changed
- sexual expression indicates a need for guardianship. In one
case, a neighbor reported that a 19 year-old youth had been in
the company of younger girls; without indicating the source of
148. DPW MnImxA 7.




her information, the neighbor suggested that "there was indica-
tion that he had sexually molested them." The report substantial-
ly quickened the tempo of casework service to the youth and his
mother. The caseworker never investigated the facts of the inci-
dent - who the girls were, their ages, whether the incident had
really occurred. The youth was committed within a month; the
welfare department ignored a psychologist's warning that the
youth's intellectual functioning was "borderline."' 5 It is obvious-
ly appropriate for the welfare departments, and the community,
to be interested in the nonmarital, sexual adventures of retard-
ates; indeed, it would be incompatible with one function guard-
ianship can serve - protection of the retardate, especially from
exploitation by others - if sexual activities were not given im-
mediate attention. But concern for the problem can be expressed
adequately, at least initially, by casework services; the counties
have often utilized guardianship as the opening gambit.
A retarded girl's out-of-wedlock pregnancy often creates a
crisis atmosphere which leads to guardianship. This problem, of
course, has been favored with specific legislative history.5 s None-
theless, the commissioner's policy is to investigate carefully
whether a pregnancy presents a problem of "unwed motherhood,"
or a situation in which a retardate is being exploited. His argu-
ment proceeds as follows: although many economically deprived,
out-of-wedlock mothers may test within the mentally deficient
range, their pregnancies need not have resulted from sexual ex-
ploitation; no matter what her intellectual capacity, every unwed
mother is entitled to receive, without sanctions, any state service
that may benefit her personally and make her a more responsible
member of society; retardates can be taught social controls by
"casework service in depth"; therefore, a retardate should not be
committed simply because she is pregnant out of wedlock, but
only if guardianship can accomplish some therapeutic purpose
with respect to her retardation."' But the counties have followed
the practice of committing any unwed mother who obtains a sat-
isfactorily low I.Q. score.'54 The Manual includes "retardation of
parents" among the "situations of persons in the higher levels of
mental retardation" in which guardianship is most often needed.
151. File . 6, Sept. 5, 1963.
152. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
153. Coakley-Bengston Interview.
154. Compare Kuhlmann 16-17: "Reliable statistics have shown that
more than one half of the professional prostitutes are feeble-minded. Probably
about the same figure holds for . . . the mothers of illegitimate children."
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'Trospective parents who are retarded may need help not only
to aid them to make a community adjustment but also to pre-
vent child neglect and the birth of children."' These comments,
and a number of the case files, suggest that many commitments
of unwed mothers can be explained more accurately by reference
to the counties' child welfare programs than they can be justified
by the purposes of the state guardianship program.
(d) Delinquency
Many retardates who become wards of the commissioner are
referred to the county welfare departments because of delinquent
or criminal behavior. When state guardianship was instituted,
retardation programs commonly assumed that "the tendency to
delinquency of all mental defectives is a well established fact."5 6
Although criminological and retardation theorizing is now much
more sophisticated, the counties still seem to assume that guard-
ianship is appropriate for any retardate who has engaged in
minor criminal or delinquent conduct. For the most part, the
probate courts have granted the petitions. It does seem likely,
however, that the welfare departments would not intervene if
the criminal offense were relatively serious - although the serious
offender might also be marginally "retarded." 5 7 In a recent case,
a 24 year-old youth had been convicted of grand larceny and sen-
tenced, with a stay, to an indeterminate term in the reformatory.
Six months later, he was apprehended breaking into a grain ele-
vator; he was jailed and referred to the welfare department. The
caseworker recommended guardianship because the youth-
whose I.Q. was 81- was "retarded both intellectually and social-
ly;" placement in a sheltered workshop was thought to be "a more
logical place" for him than the reformatory:
155. DPW MuAI 7. Until recently, the counties, with the support of
the commissioner's staff, followed the uniform practice of refusing restoration
or discharge to any female ward of childbearing age who had not been
sterilized. See id. at 68; note 63 supra.
156. Kuhlmann 16.
157. Coakley-Bengston Interview. However antisocial the person's be-
havior, the community's response has been extremely influential in determin-
ing whether a commitment petition would be filed. In one recent case, the
juvenile court judge informed the welfare department that if he received any
more complaints about a seven year-old, brain damaged and epileptic boy, and
the department took no action, he would do something himself to help the
situation. A commitment petition was filed almost immediately. File # 13,
March 30, 1960. The commissioner believes that although community feeling
has been a factor in commitment decisions, it should be considered irrelevant.
Coakley Interview, July 7, 1963.
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Though some people can manage with ... [his] I.Q.... in a com-
munity, with his lack of social training has a difficult time. He
has a poor conception of right and wrong and even now while sitting injail he cannot conceptualize that his acts have put him there. There-
fore, I do not feel time spent in a state reformatory would be of any
benefit to him nor help the community in rehabilitation.158
But the youth was at best marginally "mentally deficient." More
important, the caseworker had not really considered whether the
"corrections" program might have been more useful to the youth
than guardianship. That he suffered from a "poor conception of
right and wrong" was hardly sufficient evidence that the youth
would not have been helped most by a reformatory sentence or
by the supervision of a probation officer. The commissioner's
staff urged the county not to commit, but to leave the youth to
the criminal process and the discretion of the district judge.
The available evidence indicates that local caseworkers have
been too quick to assume that the state's criminal process has
no therapeutic value.8 9 The grain elevator case and others like it
also suggest that a critical problem - how to distinguish rational-
ly those retardates who should not be held criminally "responsi-
ble" for their behavior - has not yet been examined either by
the welfare departments or by the county attorneys. The problem
is a most difficult one, of course, 0 but it cannot be ignored -if
only because the proper scope of the retardation program must
be clarified. The commissioner would reserve guardianship for
intellectually impaired persons whose antisocial behavior indi-
cates that they can be expected to derive more benefit from
guardianship than from alternative state programs.'6 ' Although
this policy obviously cannot serve as the judicial standard for
determining responsibility, at least it affords some guidance for
the county's decision to seek guardianship. That decision, especial-
158. File 9 12, June, 1968. This was an "evaluation case"- the county
was seeking the advice of the commissioner's staff. See note 84 supra and
accompanying text. The caseworker did not explain the meaning of her
observation that "he cannot conceptualize . .. ." Considering the youth's I.Q.,
it is doubtful that she intended the comment to be taken literally.
159. The county caseworker's report in File # 12 was sent to mental retarda-
tion caseworkers in a representative sample of the state's counties. See note
128 supra. Sixteen of the respondents indicated that they would seek guardian-
ship for the youth. Of the 26 caseworkers who disapproved commitment, only
five thought that his immediate supervisor and the county welfare board
would agree with the decision. Half of the caseworkers thought that, if a
petition were filed, the probate judge would commit the youth despite his
I.Q. score.
160. See generally TASK FORCE ON LAW 36-41.
161. Coakley Interview, July 7, 1963.
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ly if it precedes prosecution,"e" may vitally affect the retardate's
interests: county attorneys are often unwilling to prosecute the
commissioner's wards.'63 On the other hand, a retardate may be
better off taking his chances in a criminal prosecution. At least
he has the benefit of procedural protections - none are likely to
be available if he is under guardianship and the commissioner
decides to incarcerate him.
3. The Counties' Practices Assessed
The Manual's suggestion that "persons in the borderline
range" may be considered "mentally deficient" if they do not
"adjust satisfactorily to society without coming to the attention
of social agencies,"' 4 must be rejected. But because such welfare
department strategems have not been questioned frequently
enough by probate judges, guardianship has been established for
persons whose intellectual capacities and behavior can hardly be
distinguished from that of the average prison or delinquency insti-
tution inhabitant.60 Certainly, "impairment in adaptive be-
havior"""o is an essential element of a functional definition of
mental retardation. Yet the guardianship program cannot be con-
sidered appropriate simply because a person does not conform
to community behavioral standards. The Task Force on Law
made the point effectively:
The use of social incompetency as the single criterion of mental retar-
dation is indefensible: for all behavioral abnormalities represent im-
pairments in adaptation, and regarding this as the sole defining char-
acteristic of mental retardation leaves no basis for distinguishing the
latter condition from other disorders of human behavior .... .67
162. MINN. STAT. § 525.753(5) (1961) permits a district court to refer
the defendant in a criminal proceeding to the probate court for examination.
"A duplicate of the findings shall be filed in the probate court, but there
shall be no petition . .. or commitment unless otherwise ordered."
163. Interview With Galen Cadle, Esq., Assistant Attorney General for
the Department of Public Welfare, in St. Paul, July 18, 1963.
164. DPW MADuAz 81-82.
165. According to a study made for the commissioner in 1962, of the
felons incarcerated in the state reformatory for men, approximately 75% were
classified as "borderline" and 25% were classified as "defective"; of Annex-
for-Defective-Delinquents inmates during the same period, 10% were classi-
fled as "dull normal," 32% -were classified as "borderline," and 56% were
classified as "defective." See Coakley, Collins & Mandel, An Evaluation of
the Post-Institutional Recidivism of Individuals Remanded to the Annex for
the Defective Delinquent for Felonious-Type Behavior 3 (July 6, 1962).
166. See TASK FORCE ON LAw 5, quoting Heber, Modifications in the
Manual on Terminology and Classification in Mental Retardation, 65 AMERI-
CAN J. OF MENTAL DEFIcIENCy 499 (1960).
167. TASK FORGE ON LAw 5.
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In short, although the two criteria of retardation -intellectual
disability and maladaptive behavior - are to some extent cor-
relative,e8 both must be satisfied in every instance. Imposition
of the protective and control features of mental health programs
should require evidence of a causal relationship between the
person's intellectual incapacity and his behavior. Thus, since
law-abiding conduct does not seem to be a function of in-
telligence alone, 69 a person with a "borderline" I.Q. should not be
made a ward of the commissioner simply because he has engaged
in delinquent or criminal behavior. The difficulties of proof can-
not be ignored, of course; but some effort must be made to dis-
tinguish "mental retardation" from "criminal behavior." 70 A
similar analysis is applicable to the problem of out-of-wedlock
pregnancies. The commissioner's approach to the low I.Q., unwed
mother is based much more sensibly on the policies of the guard-
ianship statute than are the county welfare departments' prac-
tices.'7 1
Nor is it proper for the probate courts to establish guardian-
ship, as they have, without any concern that "requires supervi-
sion" is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Dr. Kuhlmann read the
second half of the definition of "mentally deficient person" out
of the statute, at least for any person whose I.Q. score was lower
than 75.172Dr. Kuhimami's standard ignored the implications of
his accompanying statement:
168. The higher a person's I.Q. (assuming the test is accurate, of
course), the more severe and chronic the "adaptive behavior" impairment
should be to justify commitment. Per contra, the lower a person's I.Q., the
less need there is to show some behavioral difficulties for purposes of com-
mitment. But this does not mean that the behavioral criterion should disap-
pear. See note 172 infra and accompanying text.
169. "The study of the success and failure of groups of high grade feeble-
minded at large in society has recently shown that failure in meeting social
requirements is as much if not more dependent on direct moral traits, temper-
ament, and home training than on the exact grade of intelligence." Kuhlmann
17. And this was when the guardianship program was just beginning!
170. See TASK FoRcE ow LAw 39-40.
171. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
172. See note 93 supra and accompanying text. Dr. Xublmann did recom-
mend that the probate judges look to behavioral factors in deciding whether
to commit "borderline cases"-persons with I.Q.'s between 70 and 85. But
his discussion indicates that he viewed these considerations in much the same
fashion as the welfare departments now view them, rather than as a jurisdic-
tional, "requires supervision" prerequisite to commitment. For example, he
urged the judges not to permit testimony that the person "has been remunera-
tively employed and perhaps to the satisfaction of his employers, and so on.
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This does not mean that there are not some mentally deficient adults
with an intelligence quotient somewhat below .72 or .70 who for the
time being are making good. We know that there are a great many. It
only means that such adults will not be able permanently to make an
independent, honest living, without supervision and guardianship, under
any and all circumstances they are likely to meet in their lives. The
chances of their doing so are practically nil, and the risk of leaving
them unprovided for is too great... .P
These remarks take no account of several considerations essential
to a sound guardianship program: intelligence tests are not suffi-
ciently reliable to base such sharp distinctions on five point dif-
ferentials; the "retardate's" measured intelligence may change
over time; considering the number of state wards and the amount
and quality of welfare department supervision of most of them,
the "risk of leaving them unprovided for" is usually not decreased
by commitment. Nor did Dr. Kuhlmann appreciate what seems
implicit in the statutory definition and in the Masters opinion:
guardianship cannot be established unless the person has a present
and a life-long need of supervision.'" Although conditions may
arise, at some unspecified time in the future, which will prevent
a person's making "an independent, honest living," that hardly
constitutes justification for depriving him of discretion now. Such
an analysis leads us back to the abuses of Depression years. Since
the commissioner's guardianship is for the ward's life, moreover,
commitment can be justified only if the person's "impairment in
adaptive behavior" is chronic rather than situational. The Task
Force on Law recommended: 'Tlenary guardianship should be
reserved for those who are judicially determined to be incapable
of undertaking routine day-to-day decisions and who are found
to be incapable of basic self-management."ns Without these
strictures, the guardianship program violates the "basic demo-
When all this has been established as a fact . . . it proves nothing either in
regard to the mental deficiency of the case, or the need of state guardianship."
Kuhlmann 15-16.
173. Id. at 15. And see id. at 16:
Mental deficiency even below an intelligence of .70 is very fre-
quently not recognized by associates . . . . In fact the majority of
cases of about this intelligence are not recognized definitely as feeble-
minded until after the ease meets some social disaster . . . . Most en-
tirely unskilled labor requires no greater intelligence than this for
moderate success.
174. See In re Masters, 216 Minn. 553, 563, 13 N.W.2d 487, 493 (1944):
"inadequate social adjustment at one time is not conclusive that such mal-
adjustment will continue indefinitely."
175. TASK FORCE ON LAW 25.
1965] 863
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:821
cratic principle" that governmental compulsion should be per-
mitted only "to the minimum degree necessary and for the short-
est period possible."ire
If "requires supervision" were recognized as an independent
prerequisite to guardianship, the probate court would at least be
compelled to give individualized attention to the subject of the
petition. Moreover, conduct is appropriately an important de-
terminant of the propriety of governmental interference with per-
sonal privacy and liberty. (Perhaps it should not be as important
a determinant of the wisdom and utility of governmental inter-
ference which a person freely and rationally requests; but it re-
quires incredible naivete to conclude that the petition in many
commitment proceedings is in fact voluntary - even when an
adult, "borderline" retardate petitions in his own behalf.) A be-
havioral criterion could hardly make the task of categorization
any more intricate; indeed, the evidence introduced to satisfy a
"requires supervision" standard would probably add to the use-
fulness of the I.Q. data. And the standard may well be applied
more intelligently than I.Q. test scores have been: judges are
familiar with the methods, and the risks, of assessing a person's
past and likely future behavior.
There is no rational reason for welfare department opposition
to an interpretation of the statute which respects the legislative
standard. Indeed, the introduction of a behavioral prerequisite
will probably improve the guardianship program. Retardation
case loads are now so large that, in practice, caseworkers manage
to protect or supervise only those wards who are currently living
through emergencies; previously well-adjusted wards are usually
strangers when an emergency does occur.1 Any significant re-
duction in the number of wards would permit the welfare depart-
ments to improve their supervision of the remainder. A "requires
supervision" criterion would surely preclude a great many of the
commitments which now occur. Commitment as a "mentally de-
ficient person" adds nothing to the commissioner's ability to
supervise a child who has become his "ward" following a depend-
ency or neglect adjudication; by virtue of the prior juvenile court
decree, the commissioner is authorized to exercise all necessary
parental authority until the child reaches majority.?'* Some spe-
176. Id. at 19.
177. See authorities cited note 143 supra.
178. The Juvenile Court Act permits the judge, following an adjudication
terminating parental rights, to appoint the commissioner "guardian" of the
child. The purpose of the appointment is to permit protection and to author-
ize placement of the child for adoption if that is feasible. See Mnw. STAT.
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cial safeguard might be required if the child needed institutional
training - not to authorize placement, but to insure the child's
right to demand release. The "requires supervision" standard
should be applied even more rigorously: since intelligence levels
and behavioral problems are least likely to be permanent for
children as a group, mental deficiency guardianship should not be
established for any child under 18 if his difficulties can be handled
by a juvenile court.79 The retarded persons who are experiencing
situational and temporary difficulties - the unwed mothers, for
example - could also be excluded.
A "requires supervision" standard is no panacea. Dr. Kuhl-
mann suggested the risks:
But there is no objective method of evaluating [the many factors other
than lack of intelligence].. . . When we are dealing with the border-
line case ... our conclusions must in the end he based chiefly on per-
sonal judgment. We are in a realm in which the "experts" will inevit-
ably sometimes disagree.1s 0
§ 260.241(1) (1961). "This guardian has the right to make decisions affect-
ing the person of the child, including but not limited to the right to consent
to marriage, enlistment in the armed forces, to medical, surgical, or psychiatric
treatment and adoption." Mnm. STAT. § 260.941(2) (1961). But the commis-
sioner's "parental" authority ends when the child reaches majority.
One of the sample cases sent to county caseworkers, see note 128 supra,
involved a five year-old illegitimate child with multiple physical deformities.
He had earned I.Q. scores of 40 and, three months before, 50. His mother's
parental rights had been terminated. Forty of the 42 caseworkers responding
indicated that they would recommend commitment.
179. The Juvenile Court Act gives the juvenile court broad authority
to supervise and protect "delinquent," "dependent," and "neglected" children.
Mm. STAT. M§ 260.185, .191 (1961); see MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 260.015 (Supp.
1964). If "authority" is needed to compel parental behavior, the juvenile
court can provide it; if "authority" is needed to protect the retarded child in
the community, the welfare department can obtain it if the juvenile court
awards the department "legal custody" of the child. See note 237 infra. If the
child needs help in the community but the parents are not "neglecting" the
child, the welfare department can still interpose itself between the retardate
and those who might otherwise exploit him. See note 193 infra and accompany-
ing text.
In the absence of Probate Code revisions, the exemption suggested in the
text would provide the child with incidental advantages. Juvenile court
processes include procedural safeguards -such as an attorney and periodic
reviews of the child's situation-which are unknown following commitment.
In the rural counties, the probate judges exercise juvenile court jurisdiction;
the review might therefore be pro forma. Nonetheless, the fact that there will
be review may deter some improper supervision; and the child and his parents
will regularly have an opportunity to complain about the welfare department's




Dr. Kuhlmann concluded that what he called the "social cri-
terion" should not be stressed; he urged the probate judges "to
give more weight to the degree of mental deficiency, which can
be more accurately established . . . ."'1' It is clear, however, that
the absence of a criterion other than I.Q. score has too often per-
mitted inaccuracy and abuse. In the absence of post-commitment
procedural (and perhaps substantive) safeguards, the risk of
probate court caprice seems preferable. Such a choice is more
consistent with the general outlines of our political system. More-
over, if the probate judges are informed of the importance of
the commitment decision to the ward, their errors in applying
the "requires supervision" standard may be in the direction of
establishing guardianship for too few retarded persons rather
than too many. It would not seriously wrench our "basic demo-
cratic principle" to assign the burden of risk in this fashion.
C. ". . . TO REQURE ... CARE ... .:
1. The Commissioner's Policies and the Counties' Practices
An important purpose of a retardation program is to afford
retardates the protection which they cannot provide for them-
selves - protection from physical injury, from emotional harm,
from exploitation by those more favorably endowed, from eco-
nomic want. The guardian provides protection by personally in-
tervening between the retardate and any threatening aspect of
his environment. This protective function has often played a
part in welfare department decisions to seek guardianship. Its
importance in the precommitment casework process is best illus-
trated by the commissioner's belief that "parental adequacy" is
a primary determinant of the need for guardianship... 2 With
respect to this consideration, at least, the historical tradition,is
the commissioner and the countries are all in agreement.
The welfare departments have been quick to seek guardian-
ship when they have discovered a retarded child being denied
the basic necessities or an adequate environment.'" They have
also responded quickly to a retarded child left untended. In one
181. Id. at 5.
182. Coakley Interview, July 7, 1963.
183. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
184. In File 9 9, Feb. 27, 1952, the school social worker reported just
before a 14 year-old boy was committed:
The various teachers who have worked with - have all de-
scribed him as a friendly, cooperative boy who has always shown a
desire to achieve. . . . He has shown some emotional instability on
occasions but always we have felt that he could be quite easily con-
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case, guardianship was established for a 10 year-old girl after her
widowed mother's death. The sequence of events dramatically
illustrated the importance of neglect to the commitment process:
the girl was committed on March 20, 1945; less than a year be-
fore, a psychologist had reported the girl's I.Q. to be 69 -
c -is seriously retarded, to the extent of bordering on feeble-
mindedness"; in February, 1945, while the girl's mother was still
alive, her aunt petitioned to have her committed; the petition was
denied - "the County Attorney and Judge were not convinced
she was feeble-minded because she could write her name and also
her birth date and knew how far her school was from home and
how far the farm was from town"; after her mother's death, how-
ever, the girl's grandmother brought her to the county court-
house, filed another petition, and refused to take the girl back to
her home; a new psychological study reported an I.Q. of 64 and
strongly recommended guardianship; the Probate Judge com-
mitted the girl after deciding "to dispense with having the Doc-
tors at the hearing in view of the recent mental test which said
had deteriorated by about 4 or 5 points in I.Q." 5
Parents often reject a handicapped child. If the welfare de-
partment did not intervene, rejection might exaggerate the
child's handicaps and lessen his chances of making an adequate
community adjustment. The counties have petitioned in cases
of this kind and guardianship has usually resulted. Parental in-
adequacy may be much less obvious if the problem involves over-
protection. But the commissioner believes that the risks for the
retardate are substantial and he would recognize overprotection
as a relevant factor in determining the need for guardianship.
Most caseworkers would probably concur. Nonetheless, signs of
overprotection have not disposed the counties to urge guardian-
ship as aggressively as has been customary in other situations. Of
course, guardianship is usually recommended; but if the parents
are uninterested, the issue is not always pursued. For example,
one caseworker decided during a home visit in 1957 that loving,
attentive, and protective parents were not "in the mood to face
up to the . . . mental limitations" of their 18 year-old daughter.
trolled. Never has he been considered a serious behavior problem nor
have we seen any indications of anti-social tendencies.
We have always been concerned about the conditions in _ 's
home. Our contacts with the mother lead us to believe that she is
quite inadequate in taking care of this child. Often - has
shown a desire to get away from his home. .. . _ 's personal
appearance shows very clearly that there have been no standards of
cleanliness set for him in the home.
185. File # 2, March 11, 1945; see text accompanying note 92 supra.
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The caseworker urged the parents not to petition if they were
unsure. One home visit was made in 1958 and another in 1959,
but the parents still had no interest in guardianship. The case
then remained completely dormant for four years; the quiet was
not broken until the parents asked the welfare department to
commit their daughter to guardianship because she had just
been raped. 88
The inevitable concomitants of poverty have often been mis-
taken for "inadequacy" or "neglect." But the commissioner's
commitment policy would require a careful distinction. The com-
missioner believes that a retardate's financial situation, or his
parents', is not a valid measure of his need for guardianship.,'
Financial support under poor relief or child welfare legislation,
day-care facilities, foster homes, and other community services
for retardates may all be utilized without guardianship. In prin-
ciple, of course, the counties might not disagree. But the "facts of
life" often make principle a luxury; and tax rates and expense
management are important facts of government officials' lives.
Because the counties have tried to save money by maximizing
institutional care of the retarded, poverty has often been the
effective reason for the establishment of guardianship.
If a physical disability accompanies the person's intellectual
deficiency, commitment seems highly probable.s88 The views of
medical and psychological experts have been influential in these
cases. It is common, for example, for an obstetrician or pedia-
trician to advise parents to leave an obviously impaired baby
in the hospital after delivery; the doctor recommends immediate
commitment to state guardianship and refers the parents directly
to the welfare department."8 "
"Protection" may also describe a quite different function which
guardianship theoretically serves. The notion is that guardianship
will operate as an "insurance policy" - as a device to permit
"long term closeness" to the retardate so that the welfare depart-
ment will be able to step in immediately when an emergency oc-
curs.o90 When parents are urged to petition, guardianship is al-
186. File # 14, Sept. 3, 1963.
187. Coakley Interview, July 7, 1963.
188. See note 178 supra.
189. Gruber Interview.
190. Advisory Board on Handicapped, Gifted and Exceptional Children,
Report-The Trainable Retarded Child in Minnesota, 23 (June 18, 1958);
Coaldey Interview, July 7, 1963; Interview With Gerald Walsh, Executive




ways described as protective in this sense; caseworkers, parents
whose children have already been committed, educators of the
retarded, officials of the MVinnesota Association for Retarded
Children and its local chapters, all repeat the "insurance policy"
slogan. It is impossible, of course, to determine how many com-
mitments have been based solely on this view of the function of
guardianship. The substantial number of wards whose only con-
tact with the welfare department is a caseworker's semi-annual or
annual home visit provides some evidence that "insurance policy"
guardianship is prevalent.'o'
2. The Counties' Practices Assessed
No one would question the importance of the guardian's pro-
tective function. Nor is there any doubt that the welfare depart-
ments have in fact protected individual wards from a host of
difficulties which they might not have been able to resolve as well
on their own. But this is, after all, only part of the issue. Assume
that if a retardate's parents neglect him physically or emotional-
ly, he "requires care" and is therefore eligible for guardianship.
Nonetheless, more sophisticated analysis should precede the deci-
sion to establish guardianship in cases of this kind. Welfare de-
partment caseworkers should remember that guardianship is for
life, and the commissioner's authority to protect cannot be sepa-
rated from his authority to supervise and control. "[F]ormal legal
intervention should be regarded as a residual resource and should
not occur where social or personal interests can be adequately
served without it."19 2 If parental neglect is the problem, the juve-
nile court is available. There is no reason to believe that the wel-
fare departments are likely to ameliorate neglect more success-
fully when they act as agents of the commissioner than they can
as administrators of the state's child welfare program.93 That is
equally true if the child is a dependent or neglected "ward" of the
191. See authorities cited note 143 supra. In File # 17, Sept. 6, 1963, see
text accompanying note 232 infra, the caseworker wrote immediately prior to
the commitment hearing: "Since the _ 's are seeking commitment ...
to enable them to have [their son] placed at the - Home in Nebraska
... and since there is no apparent real need for service . . . there does not
seem to be a need for contact on this case except probably on an annual basis."
192. Pfnoanm ron NATIoNAL AcTIow 149.
193. In many of the rural counties, the welfare departments have such
small staffs that the same caseworkers handle child welfare as well as mental
retardation cases. In the three metropolitan counties, there are separate
staffs; but employees are chosen, basically, from the same group. Caseloads
are, if anything, larger in the retardation program.
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commissioner.'94 If the retardate's problems result primarily from
his inability to avoid exploitation, guardianship should be con-
sidered only if the welfare department can provide better protec-
tion by claiming the authority of a guardian than it can provide
by relying on its normal status as a government agency. More-
over, the counties should realize that a state agency can provide a
retardate very little protection against the everyday problems
of community adjustment; guardianship should be established
only when, whether the retardate is an adult or a child, his family
cannot equal that limited protection. In fact, it is not impossible
that the establishment of guardianship may encourage parental
rejection of the child;"' and the retardate will certainly profit
more from his parents' love, devotion, and feeling of responsibility
than he will from semi-annual visits by a welfare department case-
worker.
"Insurance policy" guardianships are in a separate category.
Simply because a retardate may profit from "long term closeness"
with the welfare department, he does not necessarily "require ...
care." In any event, representations about "long term closeness"
are, at best, inaccurate. The "insurance policy" image seems to
be, by and large, a method of selling guardianship to parents who
might otherwise be unwilling to petition. Even if their inconsist-
ency with the statute could be ignored, "insurance policy" guard-
ianships should be eliminated. Decreasing the number of wards
might permit the welfare departments to approach, for the first
time, performance of a truly protective function for retardates
who are properly under guardianship.
D. Erzzarsy
The 1935 Probate Code authorized the use of state guardian-
ship for an undefined class of "epileptic" persons. The initiative
for the amendment did not come from the Board of Control. Miss
Thomson recalled: "I did not know the content of the revised
laws until they were discussed at the annual meeting of the pro-
bate judges in January, 1935... . Problems had arisen with epi-
leptic persons too bright to be committed as feebleminded but
unwilling to apply for entrance to Cambridge even though they
were unable to adjust to community life."""s The probate judges
194. See notes 178-79 supra and accompanying text.
195. Coakley-Bengston Interview. See File $ 15 in which parents of a
mongoloid child lost interest after the child was placed in a foster home and




were, indeed, concerned about nonretarded epileptics; but they
were also concerned about welfare department practices:
[O]ur Welfare Board brings in a petition for an epileptic under the
same proceeding as if the epileptic were feebleminded. I do not believe
we should call an epileptic feebleminded any more than we should call
then [sic] insane or drunkards in order to get them into some state in-
stitution for medical treatment. 97
The drafting committee's decision not to define the term was the
product of general dissatisfaction with the prior definitions, dis-
sension among medical and Board of Control consultants, and a
persistent belief that the task was likely to prove impossible.9 8
Yet the committee's correspondence contained an important
warning from the American Medical Association:
The need, it seems to me, is not for a definition of "epilepsy" or
"epileptic," but for a definition of that state of the epileptic that calls
for intervention of a probate court. . . . It seems to me that for prac-
tical purposes the epilepsy of which a probate court may take cogni-
zance may be defined as follows:
A person is epileptic . . . when because of his suffering from epi-
lepsy, he is incapable, in the ordinary relations of life incident to his
position, of behaving himself and conducting his affairs in a manner
consistent with safety to his person or property or the persons and
property of others. 99
This statement might have sufficed - although, if applied, it
would have limited the group of epileptics subject to guardian-
ship.
The 1959 legislature finally added a provision paralleling the
definition of mental deficiency: "'Epileptic person' means any
person suffering from epilepsy and in need of treatment, super-
vision, control or care." 200 The language is not very informative,
but it does seem to establish some behavioral prerequisite to com-
mitment. A good argument can certainly be made that the defi-
nition contemplates a finding that the epileptic needs supervision
and that the need has some "proximate cause" nexus to his epi-
leptic condition. 0 Although epileptics have never been com-
197. Letter From Honorable William J. Archer to Honorable Albin S.
Pearson, April 3, 1934, on file in Ramsey County Probate Court.
198. See text accompanying notes 19-25 supra.
199. Letter From William C. Woodward, M.D. to Honorable Albin S.
Pearson, July 24, 1934, on file in Ramsey County Probate Court.
200. Must. STAT. § 525.749(7) (1961).
201. The use of the word "treatment" is one clue. There may be some
need to compel an epileptic to take medication, or to keep him from harm if
he refuses medication. It is difficult to believe that the legislature would have
wanted the commissioner to supervise a person who would otherwise be
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mitted in great numbers,2 0 2 the probate courts have ignored the
1959 amendment. In much the same fashion as the "requires su-
pervision" provision has been read out of the definition of mental
deficiency, the welfare departments and the probate courts have
been satisfied by proof of epilepsy alone. The Manual suggests
as a reason for guardianship "either the rejection or the overpro-
tection ... [the epileptic person] may be subject to at home or
in the community."203 Nonetheless, the usual purpose of commit-
ment, according to the Manual, is to make the epileptic eligible
for institutional care. The commissioner's attitude toward volun-
tary institutionalization of epileptics parallels his policy for re-
tardates. Yet there have been only about a dozen voluntary ad-
missions since 1960,204 and the county welfare departments seem
to believe that voluntary placement is in fact very difficult to ar-
range.205
The commissioner would eliminate state guardianship for epi-
leptics. His thesis is: medical treatment for epilepsy can be pro-
vided in the community without governmental supervision; an
epileptic's need for hospitalization is temporary and so obviously
in his interests that it will not have to be compelledo;2 o although
epilepsy is frequently accompanied by emotional illness or re-
tardation, these problems themselves permit the use of any neces-
sary authority; since epilepsy is an organic disease, it cannot be
distinguished, for purposes of guardianship, from any other pos-
sibly incapacitating, organic disease. The commissioner's posi-
tion is unacceptable to segments of the medical and professional
community. Thus, a 1958 special study committee, although will-
ing to authorize marriage for epileptic persons,208 refused to rec-
ommend deletion of the guardianship provision: "There was gen-
eral agreement that there were some epileptic persons not mentally
ill or mentally retarded but definitely in need of help or perhaps
removal from the community. Guardianship for these was still
considered a criminal, simply because he regularly takes a tranquilizer to
eliminate seizures.
202. Of the 464 commitments in fiscal 1962-63, 14 were both mentally
retarded and epileptic, and 8 suffered from epilepsy alone.
203. DPW MAvirAL 7.
204. Coakley-Bengston Interview.
205. File # 8, Oct., 1961.
206. Occasionally a person suffering from epilepsy has to change his
tranquilizing drug; often this entails hospitalization. Coakley-Bengston
Interview.
207. Ibid.
208. See generally Mum. STAT. § 517.03 (1961).
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the solution."209 Its supporters perceive guardianship as a means
of protecting epileptic children from the parents who make them
recluses, and from the rejection and cruelty which is often their
lot in school and in the community 10
The commissioner has the better of the argument. During the
epileptic's childhood, the juvenile court can exercise supervision
of him. It is doubtful that parental rejection or overprotection
and community prejudices can be significantly ameliorated by a
governmental protective service; in any event, there is certainly
no reason to believe that the commissioner can be any more suc-
cessful in such an endeavor than the juvenile court is likely to be.
If the epileptic is an adult, the chances are: (1) he will want any
medical treatment which improves his physical condition; (2)
if his social and emotional problems have not been treated pre-
viously, he will be incapable of significant help; or (3) his other
problems will authorize the use of some state program - guard-
ianship, perhaps, if he is also retarded - to control his behavior.
The most persuasive reason for abolishing guardianship for
epileptics is that the device has been abused by the welfare de-
partments; moreover, adequate safeguards are difficult, perhaps
impossible, to construct. Epilepsy, qua disease, has often fur-
nished a syndrome and a legal excuse for commitment; much
less frequently has it furnished justification for the establishment
of guardianship. In one recent case, a 12 year-old boy presented
a severe behavior problem; his exploits included fire-setting,
stealing, temper tantrums, building climbing, television antenna
scaling. Commitment machinery was set in motion when he took
shotgun potshots at pedestrians from a downtown roof and tried
to demolish the Juvenile Detention Center after his apprehen-
sion. The welfare department planned an emergency hearing
to commit him as mentally deficient! Deprived of this device
because the boy's I.Q. turned out to be 115, harried caseworkers
turned to his seizure history. Two months before the shooting,
the boy had been diagnosed as an epileptic; since that time he
had regularly taken anticonvulsive medication.11 The boy could
not be placed in a local residential treatment center because of
his seizures, no foster home would take him, and the personnel
in the Juvenile Detention Center could hardly be criticized for
declining the task of supervision. The juvenile court judge sug-
209. THoMsoN 224.
210. Interview With Annie L. Baker, Casework Supervisor of University
of Minnesota Hospitals, in Minneapolis, Sept. 25, 1963.
211. File $ 7, May 24, 1962.
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gested that the boy's parents commit him to guardianship as
an epileptic. A local psychiatrist, after reading the case record,
agreed:
[H]e does appear to me to be a boy who can be helped with treat-
ment, and I feel that a Cambridge placement would afford the best
chance for this. If he is in Cambridge, he will be associating with other
children, will be able to get continued education, and will not be ex-
posed to as much emotional pathology as he would in a state hospital.
Another important reason for considering commitment as epileptic
is the long-term control this will give us over this boy. His dangerous
behavior is such as to make me concerned about the possibility that he
might improve in a state hospital sufficiently to be discharged, but
then will not be under close supervision from any responsible agency.212
The probate court committed the boy although a DPW psy-
chiatrist argued at the hearing that epilepsy had nothing to do
with his problems, that he was mentally ill and should be com-
mitted to a state mental hospital."-' Eventually, the boy was
diagnosed as a "psychopathic personality." The commitment in
this case was obviously designed to obtain control of the boy
and to prevent his antisocial conduct. The boy came within the
Code's definition of an "epileptic person" - but only if the "need
of supervision" criterion does not have to be causally related
to the boy's epilepsy. Certainly the welfare department was not
concerned with his organic condition. Rather, his seizures were
used as an excuse for seeking therapeutic goals irrelevant to the
condition. Such a technique is unpleasant whether it is the
Appalachin fiasco" a Mann Act prosecution designed solely to
jail a hoodlum, or commitment of an epileptic. Misuse of the
guardianship law seldom gets as much publicity as other ex-
amples of the technique.
In another case, a 17 year-old Mexican girl, already a ward
of the commissioner as a neglected child,215 became pregnant
out of wedlock. She intended to marry a 19 year-old negro youth
who was willing to assume responsibility for the child. At the
end of October, 1959, during the fourth month of the girl's preg-
nancy, a welfare department caseworker tried to prevent the
marriage: "_ -- said that she and - are hoping to be
212. Id. July 17, 1962. At the time the state had no residential treatment
center for emotionally disturbed children. When this study was made, such
a facility had been opened, and the boy had been placed there.
218. Id. July 20, 1962.
214. See United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
215. See note 178 supra.
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married in December. I again reminded her that she was not
allowed to marry as long as she is a dependent ward of the
state. says that she understands this. ... "216 The case-
worker must have suspected that this somewhat inaccurate rep-
resentation2 17 might not be successful; in any event, one week
later the welfare department recommended the girl's commit-
ment both as mentally deficient and epileptic. Her I.Q. scores
had ranged from 78 to 99; in the examination which produced
the highest score, she had tested at least "dull-normal" on every
part of the test. In November, 1958 she had been diagnosed as
an epileptic after one seizure. The hospital had reported her
condition as "idiopathic mild" epilepsy, controllable with medi-
cation, and had predicted that no mental "deterioration" would
occur during the girl's youth. Anticonvulsive drugs had been
prescribed and the girl had taken them regularly. The file re-
corded no subsequent seizures. Obviously, the welfare depart-
ment's primary interest was to prevent the girl's marriage and
to protect her unborn baby. The referral history concluded:
She has been diagnosed as having idiopathic epilepsy with a course
of slow but appreciable deterioration. On psychological examinations
she scored in the borderline mentally deficient range with additional
problems of emotional interference. . . . She is pregnant. . . . - is
determined to be married in the near future and plans to take care of
her baby when it arrives. It is felt that due to - 's epileptic con-
dition, the fact that she is functioning at a low intellectual level, with
the probability of further deterioration, and that she has consistently
shown an inability to plan realistically, that - should be committed
to State guardianship as epileptic and/or mentally deficient. Further, it
is thought that - should be institutionalized for a period of train-
ing and that her baby should be committed as a dependent child to be
placed for adoption if and when found suitable. 218
She was committed on November 18, 1959 and kept in a
locked room at the county hospital for three weeks until trans-
216. File # 11, Oct. 27, 1959.
217. It is true that the commissioner must consent to the marriage of his
neglected ward. See note 178 supra. But the Juvenile Court Act should be
interpreted to authorize the commissioner's use of parental prerogatives only
when a parent would be able to exercise them. MMr. STAT. Amr. § 517.02
(Supp. 1964) permits any female who has attained the age of 18 to marry;
parental consent is not required to obtain a license. See Manr. STAT. ANr.
§ 517.08 (Supp. 1964). The girl could have married as soon as she reached
her eighteenth birthday. In addition, most young people know that they can
be married without difficulty before their eighteenth birthdays simply by
crossing state lines.
218. File # 11, Nov. 8, 1959.
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ferred to Faribault. The baby was born in March, 1960; in May,
the institution reported her seizures under control, no deteriora-
tion, and a prognosis of no mental change. 2 19 The baby was
placed in a foster home, and in November, 1960 the county
petitioned to terminate the girl's parental rights. The commis-
sioner, informing the juvenile court that the girl had recently
scored 86 on an I.Q. test and that he planned to file a restoration
petition with respect to her status as a mentally deficient ward,
recommended against termination of parental rights. His report
also indicated that the girl was to remain an epileptic ward
and would not be released from Faribault until the staff deter-
mined that she could adjust adequately to the community. The
juvenile court denied the parental termination petition. The girl
was finally released from Faribault in May, 1961 after a 16
month stay, and promptly married her fiance. Subsequent to
the original diagnosis of epilepsy, she suffered only one minor
seizure - and the Faribault staff was not unanimous that she
had experienced a seizure on that occasion!220
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that these cases are
atypical. Even if they are, however, the risks to which commit-
ment of epileptics are subject clearly outweigh any benefits
which may accrue from guardianship. The epilepsy experts and
the legislature were willing to permit epileptics complete freedom
to marry; any epileptic who has had no seizures for two years
may obtain a driver's license;221 even epileptics under guardian-
ship may drive if "the department is satisfied that such person
is competent to operate a motor vehicle with safety to persons
or property"; 2" epileptic children may be protected adequately
by the juvenile court. In short, state guardianship of epileptics
serves no purpose which is not irrelevant to the disability fur-
nishing the basis for its establishment. The "epileptic person"
provision should be repealed.
219. Id. May 2, 1960. The memorandum indicated that a staff committee
had discussed the case: "[Ijt was pointed out that while she was in the com-
munity she presented a serious problem, in a poor environment where she
had very little supervision. It was also brought out that - is young
and quite immature. After . . . careful consideration the members of the
committee were in agreement that - would benefit by a period of
supervision and training here." Ibid.
220. Id. Sept. 12, 1960; May 2, 1961 (memorandum from institution to
DPW).
221. Letter From D. J. Besaw, Chief Driver Evaluator of the Minnesota
Department of Highways, Nov. 19, 1963; see Mum. STAT. § 171.04(9) (1961).




No legislative program can be completely free of error. It
is not surprising, then, that even a limited exploration of the
commitment process has exposed an assortment of unsound,
even improper, practices. Yet the critical issue is whether, despite
the errors, the purposes of the retardation program can best be
accomplished by guardianship;2 2 and, if so, how to minimize
the risks of improper commitment. The importance of safeguards
cannot be underestimated: guardianship subjects the ward to a
variety of serious disabilities and to the extraordinary super-
visory powers held by the county welfare departments; for all
practical purposes, the initial proceeding in the probate court
provides the only judicial oversight of the welfare department's
use of its authority.
In fact the need for safeguards has been almost entirely ignored.
To be sure, it is not easy for the probate judges to make
satisfactory choices within the present legislative framework.
The commitment provisions of the Probate Code are hardly
models of careful legislative drafting; and appeals are so un-
common that the supreme court cannot be expected to provide
adequate guidance. Nonetheless, neither the county welfare de-
partments nor the probate courts have made any serious effort
to improve the commitment process. The inadequacies go deeper
than failure to apply the legislative standard: the welfare de-
partments have misused the guardianship program; many pro-
bate judges have completely abdicated their judicial responsi-
bilities.
The problems have not been exposed to public attention,
although they have troubled the commissioner; the problems
have not been solved, although the commissioner sees signs
of gradual improvement. The data reported here do not justify
the commissioner's optimism.m
A. PRACTICES OF THE COUNTY WELFARE DEPARTMENTS
Because the commissioner's staff has been unable to exercise
223. As the introduction to this essay indicated, no final evaluation of
state guardianship can be made until the risks (and the number of wards
likely to be subjected to those risks) can be weighed against the advantages
of the program. The discussion which follows assumes that the program is
worth saving.
224. Other representations made by the commissioner's staff have been
extremely reliable. If improvement has occurred, it should be attributed to
the sensible attitudes and fierce determination of DPW personnel.
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effective supervision of their policies,. 5 the counties have often
manipulated the guardianship program to achieve therapeutic
goals for nonretarded persons with "problems." On at least one
occasion, for example, a psychologist was asked to obtain a low
I.Q. score for a brain damaged girl; the welfare department
thought that guardianship might help to curtail her promiscuous
behavior.2 26 A psychologist recently warned the Hennepin Coun-
ty Welfare Department that "approximately six percent of the
general population would score lower" than 76 on the Wechsler
I.Q. test; yet the 19 year-old youth whose testing furnished the
occasion for this warning was committed to guardianship two
weeks later 2T In another case, a 16 year-old boy with an I.Q.
of 84 had been a severe behavior problem in his school and in the
community; he was committed and immediately institutionalized.
A week later, the institution psychologist reported that the boy
was emotionally disturbed, and the stigma of commitment for
mental deficiency would interfere with his community adjust-
ment.2 8 A subsequent memorandum from a DPW caseworker
read:
As you know, the case of - was a borderline one for commitment
in mental deficiency. At the time of referral, however, after quite a bit
of discussion, it was agreed that be [sic] was in need of some plan im-
mediately and our program seemed to be the best one according to
the material presented on him 2 29
These cases and others like them suggest that the counties
have made use of the carte blanche provided them by the pro-
225. See notes 75-85 supra and accompanying text. The Probate Code
permits the commissioner to waive the 10 day notice of a commitment hear-
ing. Mnmr. STAT. § 525.752(2) (1961). Although the commissioner's staff is
loathe to waive notice, Coakley Interview, July 7, 1963, the pressures to do
so are often great -especially when an emergency condition has somehow
been created. And emergencies, of course, pose the most substantial risk of
improper commitment. See notes 211-20 supra and 228-29 infra and accom-
panying text.
226. Interview With David S. Thorsen, M.D., in St. Paul, July 15, 1968.
227. File # 6, Sept. 5, 1963.
228. File # 5, Nov. 15, 1960. At the county welfare department's request,
the commissioner waived 10 days notice of the commitment hearing. See
note 225 supra.
229. Id. at Dec. 22, 1960. Although the commissioner's staff has tried to
achieve reform, sensible attitudes are not always adequate protection, in indi-
vidual cases, against a strong desire to "help" a person with "problems." See
text accompanying notes 112 & 123 supra. Although the commissioner's staff
subsequently tried to have the boy restored to capacity, the county dragged
its feet; a restoration petition was not filed for two and one-half years. See
text accompanying note 64 supra.
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bate courts - and misuse of the guardianship program has been
the result. These practices can be attributed, in part at least,
to the caseworkers' sincere belief that retardation program re-
sources will be most useful in the solution of pressing and difficult
social problems; the belief has been most marked when the only
alternative state program has been "corrections." Certainly,
legislative refusal to provide resources in adequate variety is
unfortunate; but legislative failings should not be corrected by
sub rosa misappropriations of existing programs - especially when
personal liberty and discretion may be at stake.
The temptation to misuse guardianship has been magnified
because guardianship decisions have often been made in a crisis
atmosphere created by the behavior that brought the person to
the welfare department's attention. It is not uncommon for a
person to be described as retarded if he has sufficiently taxed a
caseworker's patience and imagination and exhausted the other
resources of the welfare department. In one case a promiscuous
16 year-old girl had achieved I.Q. scores of 77 and 82. She had
adjusted poorly to a group home for delinquent girls and had
run away from the home on several occasions. The juvenile
court judge was considering whether to place the girl in the state
institution for delinquents, although neither he nor the welfare
department expected the experience to help her. A member of
the group home staff remembered a girl with similar problems
who had been aided by a period at the Owatonna State School;
with this information, the caseworker decided that the girl's
problems were primarily intellectual - and the girl was committed
to guardianship Y30 The commissioner refused to authorize the
girl's placement at Owatonna because she tested as "dull-normal"
and seemed to be a "socio-pathic personality."231
The welfare departments have sought guardianship to serve
a variety of other purposes which were not within the scope of
the state's retardation program. On two occasions recently, for
example, Hennepin County sought and obtained guardianship
of a retarded child to facilitate his parents' arrangements for
private institutional care after their deaths. Both couples had
230. File # 16, May 15, 1963.
231. Id. June 12, 1963. For another example of a guardianship decision
made under crisis conditions, see notes 211-20 & 225 supra and accompanying
text. For an example of the effectiveness of neighborhood campaigns, see
File $ 13, May 2, 1960; the caseworker called the boy's grandmother: "I told
her . . . this was just what the neighbor had said, and that . . . when you
have the number of complaints we have had regarding , then you
begin to believe some of them." And see note 157 supra.
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adequate life insurance and estate plans to provide care for their
child, and they were not interested in state guardianship for
protective purposes. But the private Nebraska institution with
which the parents were contracting had insisted that the children
be committed. The institution's staff wanted assurance that
Minnesota would have financial responsibility if the children's
resources were ever depleted?u The uses to which the "epileptic
person" provision has been put provide one more illustration
of the tendency to misuse the guardianship program.
The welfare departments should not bear sole responsibility,
of course; in many (if not most) of these cases, the commitment
petition should have been denied. But the county welfare de-
partments share the obligation to foster an effective guardianship
program - and, by and large, that obligation has been ignored.
B. PROBATE COURT PROCEDURES
One of the functions of the judiciary in a democratic society
is to protect citizens against abuses of governmental authority.
Unfortunately, the probate courts have not served this function
in guardianship proceedings. When a mentally ill person or an
alcoholic is committed to a state hospital, the probate judge,
the board of examiners, the guardian ad litem, all seem to be
alert, aware that there is a substantial risk that a person's
liberty may be jeopardized improperly if the petition is granted.
No wife testifies as to her husband's insanity or alcoholism with-
out being questioned closely to insure that the petition is not
one more round in a bitter interspousal vendetta. In mental
deficiency hearings, on the other hand, the judge and the board
of examiners are relaxed, unconcerned; the observer detects a
group feeling: "We can do no wrong; no harm can come from
commitment."
The Hennepin County hearings are described as typical.m3
They are conducted in a standardized fashion: The court com-
missioner's assistant escorts the parents and the retardate into
the hearing room and introduces them to all the other partici-
pants; the county attorney asks the parents if they recognize
the petition and if they signed it willingly; after receiving an
affirmative answer, the county attorney asks the welfare de-
partment's "court unit" caseworkerm34 to describe the facts of
232. File # 17, April 17, 1963; File # 18, Sept. 20, 1963; see note 191 supra.
238. Coakley Interview, July 7, 1963.
234. Hennepin County Welfare Department assigns three caseworkers to
"represent" the department in judicial proceedings. In the juvenile court, the
880
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the case; after the caseworker's cursory recitation, the court
commissioner turns to the medical examiners, seated immediately
behind him, and asks for the mental age and I.Q. of the subject
of the petition; one member relays the information and the court
commissioner asks: "Are you Doctors in agreement that
is commitable as a mentally deficient person?"; the doctors re-
spond affirmatively; he then asks the guardian ad litem if he has
any questions; the guardian usually has none; the court com-
missioner then pronounces the commitment order. In one recent
session in Hennepin County, 13 persons were committed in 55
minutes?' Since the probate courts are not provided with court
reporters, the proceedings are not recordedM6
If the probate courts all operate in this fashion, the commit-
ment hearing could be eliminated. For all practical purposes,
the probate court simply provides signatures and a seal for an
exercise of discretion by the welfare department. So much has
been emasculated that the hearing provides no safeguards to
the "patient." In the first place, the evidence introduced to
justify guardianship is usually untested. Caseworkers in the
welfare department and the court commissioner can recall only
one contested proceeding in Hennepin County237 (The court
unit aids the assistant county attorney; in mental deficiency commitment
hearings, although a representative of the county attorney's office attends,
see text accompanying note 3 supra, the court unit caseworker actually
handles presentation of the case. In rural areas, the county attorney probably
presents the case.
235. The hearing date was Sept. 20, 1963. The author attended the session.
236. Some of the attitudes about procedural formality are implicit in a
caseworker's remark about an attorney's methods in one very unusual case:
"Mr. [the attorney] took the lead at the hearing, defended _
[the patient], and even carried it to the extreme where he had a court reporter
in to take down everything that was said." File # 13, June 24, 1960.
237. Interview With Frank Bessesen, Esq., Court Commissioner of the
Hennepin County Probate Court, in Minneapolis, Sept. 20, 1963. The Henne-
pin County court unit supervisor indicated that if it seems likely that parents
of a retardate will oppose a commitment which the welfare department be-
lieves to be essential (on occasion, even if the parents are unwilling to sign
the petition), a petition is filed in the juvenile court alleging the child's
dependency or neglect. It has not been difficult to make a case that the
child is ". . . without the special care made necessary by his . . . mental
condition because his parent . . . neglects or refuses to provide it . . . ."
MN. STAT. ANw. § 260.015(10)(e) (Supp. 1964). Or the petition might
allege that the child is ". . . in need of special care . . . required by his
... mental condition and . . . [his] parent . .. is unable to provide it .. . ."
Moo. STAT. AmN. § 260.15(6)(b) (Supp. 1964). After the child has been
adjudicated either neglected or dependent, and "legal custody" has been
awarded to the welfare department, Mmi. STAT. ANN. § 260.015(8) (Supp.
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commissioner "settled" the case by dismissing the petition with-
out prejudice.)2 The Manual indicates that in most instances
certified copies of the psychologist's report will satisfy the pro-
bate court. It continues: 'Trobably, only in the occasional case
in which commitment is strongly opposed, will a request for
direct testimony from the psychologist be considered neces-
sary."239 Very seldom is the retardate questioned, regardless of
his I.Q. level; and the information elicited from parents, relatives,
or the occasional caseworker who appears,2 40 is minimal. In the
hearings observed during this study, neither the judicial officer
nor the members of the examining board read the referral history
or the psychological reports presented with each petition. It is
likely that the psychiatrist who administers I.Q. tests for the
hearing checks the other scores achieved by the retardate. It
is also possible that rural judges pay more attention to the in-
formation at their disposal.2 4 ' Nonetheless, it is apparent that
most hearings are pro forma.24
1964), the parents often feel that they have no right to oppose the mental
deficiency commitment - even though they may appear at the hearing and
make their wishes known to the examining board. Interview With Mrs. Doris
Nelson, Supervisor in the Court Unit of the Hennepin County Welfare De-
partment, in Minneapolis, July, 1963.
238. File # 13, Oct. 28, 1960. The attorney had been representing the boy
in a negligence action. A little less than two years later, the father agreed to
guardianship; the boy was committed and institutionalized. Id. Aug. 17, 1962.
239. DPW MAuA 82.
240. In the 13 cases heard by the Hennepin County court commissioner on
Sept. 20, 1963, only four caseworkers appeared. None of them volunteered
any information. The Hennepin County caseworkers seldom attend the
hearings. Interview With Alice D. Smith, Supervisor of the Mental Retarda-
tion Unit of the Hennepin Court Welfare Department, in Minneapolis, July
25, 1963. It is likely that in the rural counties the caseworkers who have
most intimate knowledge of the case appear and take part.
241. See, e.g., the text preceding note 185 supra. At least some of the
rural probate court hearings are more formal and more thorough. Since in
every county but Hennepin, Ramsey, and St. Louis the probate court exercises
juvenile court jurisdiction, it is likely that in rural areas the judge may be
more familiar with the patient and his family.
242. Several persons interviewed felt that the hearing should be "less
traumatic" for the retardate and his family. Miss Thomson commented:
The actual hearing from a social worker's standpoint is very hard
on all concerned - this is based on "legal protection." I've always
wished the higher grade persons did not have to be in court and listen
to their shortcomings recounted. Then when parents bring children to
the court house and . . . are sometimes questioned as though they
were adversaries, it is a trying experience. . . . I've always wished
legal protection could be extended in a pleasanter manner.
Letter From Miss Mildred Thomson, July 17, 1963, on file in the University
of Minnesota Law Library.
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Many of the probate judges lack any clear understanding of
their function. The Probate Code seems to give the judge judicial
responsibility; the attorney general has ruled that the examining
board and the judge constitute a group and the majority's de-
cision is binding.24 3 Yet the Hennepin County court commis-
sioner ventures that he is not qualified to make "medical judg-
ments"; if the doctors recommend guardianship, he would com-
mit. The commissioner believes that it is his task "to see that
the proceedings are conducted fairly, in an orderly fashion, and
according to the rules of evidence." 24 4 The psychiatrists who
participate in retardation hearings apparently believe that they
wield the real decisional power.2 45 Il Hennepin County, the
assistant court commissioner chooses the psychiatrists for the
examining board, and she restricts the group to three or four
practitioners;248 as a result, there has been no opportunity for
different attitudes toward commitment policy to be manifested.
This is probably not an accurate picture of all the probate
judges, of course; but there is good reason to believe that the
Hennepin County hearings are entirely too representative.
The appointment of a guardian ad litem has been standard
since the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized in the Wretlind
case247 that the subject's interests and those of the petitioner
(either his parents or the welfare department) may be adverse.
In Hennepin County the guardian is appointed from a group
of lawyers whose names are provided by the bar association.
In Ramsey County, one attorney acts as guardian in all cases.
The caseworkers are not sympathetic to the guardian's role and
seem to believe that his presence deters parents' petitions.2 48
In fact, guardians have not often disturbed the placidity of
248. See note 39 supra.
244. Interview With Frank Bessesen, Esq., Hennepin County Court Com-
missioner, in Minneapolis, Sept. 20, 1963.
245. Interview With David S. Thorsen, M.D., in St. Paul, July 15, 1963.
Dr. Thorsen and several other psychiatrists who have participated as mem-
bers of examining boards complained that their role at the hearing had
never been explained to them.
246. Ibid.
247. In re Wretlind, 225 Minn. 554, 32 N.W.2d 161 (1948).
248. See THoMsoN 176-77:
Many parents, while eager that their children be protected, feared a
law that, interpreted literally, might mean that they could no longer
have any control in planning for them. They . . . questioned whether
the state could be trusted. . . .
My ability to understand a parent's hesitancy may have been en-
hanced because of . .. [In re Wretlind]....
To me, the supreme court here showed a misconception of the
significance of guardianship, which was intended to be basically pro-
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commitment proceedings. Many attorneys believe that the
guardian serves no real function. In a recent session in Hennepin
County, during which 13 persons were committed, the guardian
asked only two questions.2 49 In one case he asked the age of the
petitioning father. In another, the petitioners were making ar-
rangements for their adult son's eventual institutionalization in
Nebraska; they were so concerned that the welfare department
might try to take custody of their son that their own attorney
accompanied them to the hearing. The guardian asked the
parents whether they understood the petition and wanted state
guardianship. There is hardly any doubt that if he had pursued
the matter, explaining the prerogatives to which guardianship
entitled the commissioner, these parents would have withdrawn
their petition.2 0
Only one of the Hennepin County guardians ad litem, of those
interviewed, seemed to understand his role. He stated that he
customarily opposed commitment unless the retardate needed
treatment which could not be obtained without guardianship.
But this attorney lacked basic information about the retarda-
tion program: he believed that casework services, foster care,
and institutionalization could be obtained only after guardian-
ship was established; and he had been informed that priority for
institutional care was based solely on a "waiting list."21 In short,
the guardian ad litem has not usually precluded unnecessary or
improper commitments.
Many of the psychiatrist members of examining boards share
the common attitude that a low I.Q. is sufficient evidence of
"mental deficiency."2 52 In Hennepin County, one member of the
examining board is always a psychiatrist who claims to be skilled
in administering I.Q. tests. In fact, this psychiatrist specializes
tective. . . . The probate courts had to change their procedures,
however, making hearings more cumbersome and less informal-and
thus more difficult for the families....
249. See note 235 supra. The supervisor of Hennepin County's Court
Unit suggested that the guardian ad litem does not do anything because in
the usual case "there is nothing to be done." Interview With Mrs. Doris
Nelson, Supervisor of the Court Unit of the Hennepin County Welfare De-
partment, in Minneapolis, July, 1963.
250. File g 17, Sept. 20, 1963. See text accompanying note 932 Supra.
Of course, the guardian should represent the ward's interests rather than his
parents'. But if the parents are concerned about the commissioner's powers
as guardian, their interests and their son's coincide.
251. Interview With Thomas Scallen, Esq., in Minneapolis, October, 1968.
252. Interview With David S. Thorsen, M.D., in St. Paul, July 15, 1963.
When the issue is "mental deficiency," of course, a psychologist would prob-
ably be more helpful than a psychiatrist. And the statute permits the
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(without training) in 10 minute oral examinations - with ques-
tions apparently derived from a Stanford Binet primer. He
claims that his scores are usually within 10 points of prior
tests;"' but 10 points is a large margin when commitment seems
to turn, however improperly, on the I.Q. score alone. In any
event, the psychiatrist has access to prior scores when awarding
his own. The most charitable comment one can make about the
Hennepin County practice is that these I.Q. tests cannot be con-
sidered a reliable safeguard against improper commitments. In
the other counties, apparently, the examining board relies upon
I.Q. scores reported in the petition.
Because psychiatrists who appear in commitment hearings
differ in their attitudes as to appropriate retardation treatment,
the hearings differ from county to county and with each change
in the examining board. Some psychiatrists feel that the hearing
should be a therapeutic experience for the retardate's family;
others try to insure that the welfare department has "worked
up" the case adequately and has explored alternatives other
than commitment.254 These efforts may have been successful in
deterring inappropriate petitions in Ramsey County, but clearly
they have not resulted in many, if any, dismissals2 " Nonethe-
less, considering the Hennepin County practice, frequent changes
in the examining board seem to be a good idea; it is always
possible that an unseasoned member may be reluctant to estab-
lish guardianship.
It is not surprising, under these conditions, that the welfare
departments' recommendations have been extremely influential.
In Hennepin County, only two petitions have been rejected by
the court commissioner and his examining board. The "court
unit" caseworker tries to "gloss over" "bad" evidence so that
the hearing will be less traumatic for the retardate and his
family?"6 As a result, the proceeding-already ineffective because
the participants either do not know or will not fulfill their respon-
appointment of a psychologist to the examining board. See note 37 upra
and accompanying text. It seems likely that psychiatrists are often appointed
because mental illness and mental deficiency hearings are commonly held on
the same day. Hennepin County's practice, see note 82 supra, is the exception.
253. See File 9 13, Aug. 19, 1963 (cross-examination of pysciatrist).
254. Interview With David S. Thorsen, M.D., in St. Paul, July 15, 1963.
255. In Hennepin County, the court unit caseworker could remember only
one petition, other than File # 18, see note 287 apra, which had been denied.
The county had obtained an I.Q. score of 50 but at the hearing the psychia-
trist assigned the patient a score of 100. Interview With Mrs. Doris Nelson,
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sibilities - lacks relevant information which might permit its im-
provement. On the other hand, the commissioner's views have
not been equally influential.2 57
Probate court decisions are seldom appealed. The families
who appear unwillingly seldom have the financial resources or
the social sophistication to consider hiring their own lawyer, and
the probate court seldom provides one for the "patient." Neither
the guardian ad litem nor the judicial officer tells the family that
they can appeal the decision. The Hennepin County court com-
missioner reports that none of his decisions has been appealed.25 8
The paucity of Minnesota Supreme Court decisions of state
guardianship cases suggests that the experience in other counties
is probably similar.
CONCLUSION
No blueprint has been provided for determining whether a
person with below average intellectual capacity should be made
a ward of the commissioner. Indeed, such a blueprint - even if
it could be devised - would contribute little to the major purpose
of this discussion. It is essential, rather, that current inadequa-
cies be recognized. The guardianship program obviously functions
with little regard for the legislature's decision as to its appropriate
scope. Of course, this is not the first - nor will it be the last -
exploration of the disparity between "law on the books" and "law
in action."28 In some instances, the most appropriate response
is to "leave well enough alone" - especially if no one is being
injured, and legislative or judicial "reform" is either infeasible
or might result in a less adequate program.2 0 But the commit-
ment process can and should be modified: some of the commis-
sioner's wards, and their families, are being imposed upon, and
many more wards are subject to serious risk of imposition; more-
over, effective reform can be accomplished.
The legislature can surely make improvements. The guardian-
ship statute should be amended to include some postcommitment
safeguards;26 at the same time, the statute's definitions should
be reviewed - and modified. It would not be difficult to dif-
ferentiate, at least in general terms, those retardates (if there are
257. See notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text.
258. Interview With Frank Bessesen, Esq., Hennepin County Court Com-
missioner, in Minneapolis, Sept. 20, 1963.
259. Of. Wels, New York: The Poor Man's Reno, 35 CoRNEri L.Q. 303
(1950); Note, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1304 (1953).
260. Cf. Schwartz, Book Review, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 914 (1948).
261. Consider, in this connection, a suggestion that the Scandinavian
Ombudsman be adapted to needs in the United States. Davis, Ombudsmen in
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any) who are most likely to need the commissioner's guardianship
for the rest of their lives. Retardates who need some casework
supervision or protection for situational difficulties might be
separately described - in a definition which circumscribes the
commissioner's powers and maximizes the retardate's personal
prerogatives?60 2 More careful definitions are likely to improve
the commitment process: by clarifying the behavioral and in-
tellectual circumstances which justify the use of a protective
(and authoritative) social program; and, equally important, by
clarifying the roles in the hearing of members of the examining
board and the judicial officer. Needless to say, no legislative defi-
nition can guarantee effective judicial implementation. But stat-
utory precision at least gives the probate judges guidance; they
may be encouraged, in turn, to fulfill their responsibilities.
Effective postcommitment safeguards will help to minimize the
remaining risks.
Better legislative policies are not likely to correct one of the
major difficulties in the commitment process - the extent to
which welfare department caseworkers view guardianship as a
means to "help" people with "problems." If the probate court
hearing were to function properly, however, a large part of the
welfare department's present discretion in obtaining guardian-
ship powers would be eliminated; and postcommitment safe-
guards could protect retardates properly subjected to some
measure of governmental authority.
Even if legislative reforms cannot be expected, the commit-
ment process can be improved. If probate judges appreciate the
possible consequences of commitment, they may take the risks
into account: hearings can elicit all relevant information about
the prospective ward; the decision to establish guardianship can
be made with concern proportionate to the importance and diffi-
culty of the underlying legal and social issues. If members of
examining boards, guardians ad litem, and especially probate
judges, were better informed about the guardianship program,
it is not unlikely that they would all be willing - indeed, anxious
- to do a better job. This much is certain - they cannot avoid
the responsibility they have to promote an effective guardian-
ship program and to preserve the civil liberties of the intel-
lectually deprived.
America. Officers To Criticise Administrative Action, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
1057 (1961). Exploration of the types and scope of such safeguards should
accompany a detailed examination of the commissioner's actual supervision
of his wards. But it is clear that some safeguard must be provided. See the
text accompanying notes 42-65 supra.
262. See note 192 supra.
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